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Few individuals in the history of political philosophy are as polarizing as Niccolò 
Machiavelli. One of the most prominent figures of the Renaissance, the name of 
Machiavelli quickly became known to his contemporaries and to posterity as a symbol of 
duplicity, immorality, and ruthless pragmatism. After its posthumous publication in 
1532,1 The Prince granted its author recognition throughout Christendom as being “of the 
devil,” and this historical tradition has continued to dominate the majority of scholarly 
and public opinion on Machiavelli ever since.2 Machiavelli was hardly alone in 
promulgating a political philosophy that was not in perfect synchronization with 
Christian morality, yet he stands above all others in the ranks of those considered 
irreligious and heretical. A long line of philosophers, theorists, and even reformers such 
as Martin Luther advised actions that opposed prevailing religious sentiment and 
teaching, and most have seen history and scholarship either ignore or vindicate their 
positions—with the seemingly singular exception of Machiavelli. As noted by historian 
Quentin Skinner: “so much notoriety has gathered around Machiavelli’s name that the 
charge of being a Machiavellian still remains a serious accusation in political debate.”3 
Seminal and formative scholarship on Machiavelli has hitherto largely dismissed 
or generalized the interplay between the author and the religious Christian intellectual 
milieu of Renaissance Florence. In his Foundations of Modern Political Thought—an 
                                                
1 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. by George Bull (London: Penguin, 1999). 
Except where noted, all references in English are to Bull’s edition, hereafter cited as Bull, 
The Prince, here xii.  
2 Maurizio Viroli, Redeeming The Prince: The Meaning of Machiavelli’s Masterpiece 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 1. 
3 Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 1.   
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erudite and expansive two-volume introduction to the transitional period of political 
thought spanning from the late thirteenth-century to the end of the sixteenth-century—
Skinner innovatively argued that, contrary to prevailing belief, The Prince was not a 
work sui generis, but rather: a “contribution to the genre of advice-books for princes 
which at the same time revolutionized the genre itself.”4 Though Skinner conducts his 
reading of The Prince within the surrounding context of Italian humanism, skillfully 
placing the arguments of Machiavelli in the existing current of other writers such as 
Pontano, Castiglione, and Patrizi, his study still largely neglects extending this contextual 
framework to the relationship of Machiavelli and religion. Skinner instead focuses on 
Machiavelli’s criticism and revision of several tenants of contemporary Florentine 
humanism, and his challenges to “the prevailing assumptions of the mirror-for-princes 
writers in discussing the role of virtù in political life.”5  
The most obvious of these challenges is in Machiavelli’s denial of the “central 
conclusion” of previous leading theorists of princely government: “that if a ruler wishes 
to maintain his state and achieve the goals of honor, glory, and fame, he needs above all 
to cultivate the full range of Christian as well as moral virtues.” Machiavelli “rejects with 
great vehemence” this prevailing belief—instead asserting that the only true way for a 
ruler to maintain his state is to “shake off the demands of Christian virtue, 
wholeheartedly embracing the very different morality which his situation dictates.”6 
However, Skinner rightly notes that the main locus of Machiavelli’s advice “does not 
generally involve him in abandoning the conventional moral norms,” but rather the 
                                                
4 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1: The 
Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 118 (emphasis original).  
5 Ibid., 131.  
6 Ibid., 131; 134-35. 
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“essential contrast” between Machiavelli and his humanist contemporaries is between 
two different moralities: “two rival and incompatible accounts of what ought ultimately 
to be done.”7 
 Recent scholarship, however, has begun to reexamine the religious and 
moral assessments of Machiavelli and his writings. Several scholars have delved into the 
direct connections between Judeo-Christian scripture and theology and Machiavelli’s 
political writings—most often focusing on The Prince in particular. For his part, John H. 
Geerken argues that for Machiavelli, Moses was fundamentally important and provided 
Machiavelli a “middle ground between pagan and Christian alternatives.”8 Geerken 
asserts that Machiavelli used Moses: 
“not to make fundamentally ironic points about religion to an audience already 
imbued with anticlericalism, but to personify and dramatize his claim that the 
military and the prophetic can be effectively conjoined, indeed must be so 
conjoined if long-term political greatness is to be successfully achieved.”9  
Rather than accept an ironic or simply rhetorically utilitarian purpose for Machiavelli’s 
linking of God and Moses with separate, secular and pagan historical figures, Geerken 
takes the position that by introducing God and Moses: “Machiavelli was manipulating 
basically secular and potentially skeptical readers into more willing acceptance of a 
                                                
7 Ibid., 135. See in this connection also Isaiah Berlin, “The Originality of Machiavelli,” in 
Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1980), 25-79, originally published in Studies on Machiavelli, ed. Myron P. 
Gilmore (Florence: Sansoni, 1927), 147-206. 
8 John H. Geerken, “Machiavelli’s Moses and Renaissance Politics,” in Journal of the 
History of Ideas 60, no. 4 (1999): 594-95. 
9 Ibid., 595.  
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religious dimension by inserting it and then immediately withdrawing it.”10 Geerken’s 
discussion rests on the implicit assumption that Machiavelli (to put it colloquially) 
‘believed in’ both God and Moses as understood by orthodox biblical theology. 
Therefore, their invocation was an honest reference to their respective roles and 
legitimacy, biblically understood, that Machiavelli marshalled in order to provide 
religious exemplification for his cause of reforming contemporary religion and restoring 
liberty to Florence.  
In contrast, Graham Hammill explores this interplay between Judeo-Christian 
theology Machiavelli’s political thought, but with a rather disparate result than that of 
Geerken. Hammill, in The Mosaic Constitution, analyzes the uses and implication of the 
scriptural figure of Moses and his role in the emergence of early modern concepts of the 
state—beginning with Machiavelli.11 Like Geerken, Hammill asserts one of the ways 
Machiavelli used Moses in The Prince was “to measure Savonarola’s successes and 
failures.”12 However, Hammill goes on to state: “in the process showing how a new 
prince needs to use the fiction of religion to maintain obedience through the manipulation 
of belief.”13 Hammill begins his study of political theology—understood by him as the 
“seemingly unavoidable level of commerce between religious belief and civil modes of 
communal life that distresses and stains the idea of a purely secular political 
community”—with Machiavelli because: “not only does Machiavelli initiate a secular 
vision of politics; he also probes the politico-theological predicaments that this vision of 
                                                
10 Ibid., 591.  
11 Graham Hammill, The Mosaic Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2012). 
12 Ibid., 1; See in this connection also Geerken, “Machiavelli’s Moses,” 591-92.  
13 Hammill, Mosaic Constitution, 1.   
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politics produces in an attempt to sort them out.”14 Moses and Hebrew scripture, then, 
serve for Machiavelli in The Prince nothing more than a utilitarian purpose: examples of 
how a prince can “instrumentalize religious belief in order to legitimate and bolster his 
authority” through the use of “divine violence” and scripturally-related “charismatic 
authority.”15 Hammill also notes that Machiavelli forged “a new link between ancient 
Jewish texts and the Christian West” through treating “Hebrew scripture as political 
history.”16  
In addition to these textually focused discussions, more expansive methodological 
studies considering the question of Machiavelli and his Christianity have been lately 
produced. Some contemporary scholars, such as Maurizio Viroli, have argued for an 
interpretation of Machiavelli and The Prince, in particular, much more deeply embedded 
in a religious context. Viroli contends explicitly that religion—especially “Christian 
religion properly interpreted”—was a fundamental element of Machiavelli’s republican 
political thought, and “utterly necessary to found, preserve, and reform good political 
orders.”17 According to Viroli: 
“Machiavelli thought of himself as a Christian: a Christian sui generis, certainly 
not a Christian in full compliance with the church of Rome; with a God all his 
own, but not a God that he invented out of whole cloth; in other words, a God that 
                                                
14 Ibid., 31.  
15 Ibid., 32. 
16 Ibid., 32. 
17 Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli’s God (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), xi-
xiii.  
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had a great deal in common with the God that existed in the religious 
consciousness of the Florence of his time.”18  
And while Viroli goes on to qualify his position, stating: “I think that the Christian God 
did not occupy the central place in Machiavelli’s soul. His own spiritual food, the one 
that was giving him true life as he understood it, was love of country”—his interpretation 
does not wholly rule out the possibility of a religious salvation of Machiavelli’s eternal 
soul.19 In accordance with this view, Viroli argues in a separate work that: “Machiavelli 
wrote The Prince to design and invoke a redeemer of Italy capable of creating, with 
God’s help, new and good political order, thereby attaining perennial glory.”20  
Other scholars, such as Robert Black, reinforce the regnant, traditional view of 
Machiavelli as an irreligious—if not atheistic—pragmatist whose relationship with 
Christianity goes only so far as is politically useful. Indeed, in the Preface to his 
intellectual biography, simply titled Machiavelli, Black states his authorial purpose as an 
attempt to: “begin to bring the vast subject of Machiavelli—as it has lately developed—to 
a wider readership.”21 For Black, however, any ‘lately developed’ scholarship that sought 
to “whitewash Machiavelli the radical” was “misleading” and “misguided”, if not 
categorically incorrect.22 In fact, he argues that Machiavelli was: “history’s most startling 
commentator on politics”; who, characterized by his “radical” “uniqueness”, believed that 
“politics were outside the realm of ethical principles.”23 Black’s Machiavelli “was no 
conventional Christian, indeed no Christian at all, and possibly even an effective atheist. 
                                                
18 Ibid., xiii.  
19 Ibid., xiii. 
20 Viroli, Redeeming The Prince, 3.  
21 Robert Black, Machiavelli (New York: Routledge, 2013), xxvii.  
22 Ibid., xix-xxiv.  
23 Ibid., xviii-xix.  
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While he did accept the existence of a natural order, he did not believe in a moral or 
providential order,” who “died a religious radical—with no second thoughts about the life 
he had led.”24 
The debate over Machiavelli’s Christianity has been waged since even before the 
Florentine himself was even laid to rest. Francesco Guicciardini, a humanist 
contemporary and close friend of Machiavelli, once joked in a letter: “My very dear 
Machiavelli…if at this age you start to think about your soul, because, since you have 
always lived in a contrary belief, it would be attributed rather to senility than to 
goodness.”25 This is a question that persisted throughout the sixteenth-century and 
beyond. But despite the voluminous work dedicated to the study of Niccolò Machiavelli 
and his writings, however, the majority of scholarship has given short shrift to the 
relationship between Machiavelli’s political theology and the Christian context from 
which it emerged. 
Black and Viroli, therefore, stand at (or at least very near) the forefront of the 
opposing sides of this newly emerging scholarly spectrum. In promulgating their views, 
each dutifully enlists scores of academics, theorists, and accepted sources—both 
contemporary and historical—to assert their respective arguments in comprehensive and 
persuasive ways. It speaks to the truly innovative and lasting impact of Machiavelli and 
his writings, so often characterized by paradox and ambiguity, that separate parties can 
believably, if not definitively, present almost completely opposite moral and religious 
                                                
24 Ibid., xix; 287. 
25 Francesco Guicciardini to Machiavelli, dated 17 May 1521. Except where noted, all 
personal correspondences in English are to Machiavelli and His Friends: Their Personal 
Correspondence, trans. by James Atkinson and David Sices (Dekalb, Illinois: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1996), hereafter cited as Atkinson and Sices, Machiavelli and 
His Friends, here 221. 
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interpretations. Arguably, this is a debate that can never be solved. However, 
understanding the unique version and role of religious morality and theology (more 
specifically, those of Christianity) in the political philosophy of Machiavelli remains 
quintessential to interpreting his works, as well as contributing a crucially influential 
piece to the broader scholarly interest regarding religion in the development of 
modernity.  
Rather than attempt to authoritatively prove whether or not Machiavelli the man 
was or was not a Christian, or even to what extent he subscribed to orthodox Christian 
teachings in his personal life, the much more fruitful task lies in examining these 
elements within the political philosophy expounded in his writings and how they could 
have emerged out of his Christian context. This is a goal quite similar to those of Black 
and Viroli. Black, as previously mentioned, finds Machiavelli to be an innovative radical: 
repeatedly rejecting the norms and contentions of his socio-theological context. Viroli, on 
the other hand, finds Machiavelli to be a variation on a theme: a resulting product of his 
humanist and Christian environment, who seeks to reform the contours of action and 
belief from within, rather rejecting or standing wholly apart.  
If Black and Viroli represent the opposing extremes of scholarly interpretation, I 
contend that the answer therefore lies somewhere towards the middle—though, 
admittedly, much closer to the side of Viroli. While Machiavelli was undoubtedly a 
unique and innovative theorist and writer, when viewed through the interpretive 
framework of the humanist and Christian religious traditions that comprised the socio-
political intellectual milieu of Renaissance Florence, many of his putatively radical or 
irreligious beliefs and prescriptions take on a much less revolutionary simulacrum. His 
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characterization as an amoral misanthrope, or, as Black repeatedly opines, “an effective 
atheist,”26 is largely textually unfounded, and misunderstands the explicit goals and 
desires of Machiavelli. However, the narrow, humanistic definition of Renaissance 
Christianity used by Viroli in placing Machiavelli within his social context—while, in my 
opinion, largely accurate and scholastically necessary—inappropriately minimizes the 
inimical and striking reaction of his contemporaries. Such reaction to The Prince and 
Discourses on Livy denote the presence of unique differences between how and what 
Machiavelli was saying compared to more orthodox humanist and religious theorists.  
In this paper I will argue the thesis that the beliefs and intellectual traditions 
surrounding Christian conceptions of morality and theology played a fundamental role in 
Machiavelli’s political philosophy. Despite his comparative originality and pragmatic 
focus, Machiavelli’s ideological foundation was composed of such religious elements, 
and are thus inseparable from his political thought. Rather than mark the divorce of 
politics and religion, then, Machiavelli’s basic understanding of the world was steeped in 
the Florentine Christian milieu from which it emerged. While his beliefs were reframed 
through his own unique framework of political expediency, he neither sought nor 
succeeded in recasting successful politics outside the realm of conventional morality. The 
ultimate purpose of Machiavelli’s political works, including and especially that of The 
Prince, was intended to promote governance that would allow for the best welfare of his 
country and its people, and from the texts themselves it is clear that he did not conceive 
of the possibility that such goals could be achieved without traditional morality or 
Christian religious theology.    
                                                
26 Black, Machiavelli, xix.  
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The Nature of Things 
 
Before considering any theological or moral implications of the numerous, and 
often controversial, pragmatic precepts that constitute the corpus of Machiavellian 
political advice, it is crucial to first explore and define various aspects of Machiavelli’s 
political world. Within the sphere of political action, and in a broader sense the world at 
large,27 Machiavelli understood there to be several distinct elements that determined the 
outcome and progression of human endeavors—each characterized by its own unique 
nature, each independent, but also invariably impacted by its interaction with the others. 
Of these, by far the most significant being: God, fortune, and human nature itself. 
Machiavelli built his political philosophy upon, and often in reaction to, the ideological 
cornerstone of his interpretation of these three natures and their corresponding 
relationships. His views on nature are the collective wellspring from which all of his 
subsequent advice flows.  
Such an analytical framework has been asserted and accepted by countless 
scholars across almost as many decades. Indeed, many in the scholarly contingent who 
hold Machiavelli as a piteously pragmatic profligate, prophet of the pursuit of power in 
politics, and the premier purveyor of personal pessimism point to his explicit statements 
regarding nature as proof. Robert Black, for example, maintains that: “Machiavelli had a 
fundamental set of principles that changed little throughout his writings,” and proceeds to 
repeatedly utilize Machiavelli’s assorted invectives on human nature to support his 
scholarly interpretation that the Florentine’s immutable principles included a belief in 
                                                
27 For my purposes, however, I will mostly restrict the following discussion to the realm 
of politics and human government, as was the preferred framework of our advisor to 
princes.  
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“evil human nature, [the] rejection of Christianity and orthodox religion.”28 When 
introducing his discussion to The Prince, Black declares: “The environment of The 
Prince is overwhelmingly negative: it is a corrupt political world that the new prince 
inhabits”; and goes on to supplement this assertion with various statements of 
disapprobation from Machiavelli toward the nature of man.29  
Black is doubtlessly correct when he states that: “growth and development were 
not key features of Machiavelli’s ideas,” due to maintaining a “fundamental set of 
principles,” as I have similarly introduced. It is only when concerning the exact makeup 
of these precepts that I diverge from Black and many others. This departure from Black 
and those of his critical persuasion begins with an opposite comprehension of 
Machiavelli’s views of nature. Such a different interpretation [or similar, for that matter] 
is not due to an antithetical reading of Machiavelli’s texts, however, but to a far more 
accurate contextual understanding of the Christian milieu from which they emerged. For 
what has largely been overlooked or misunderstood by both popular perception and 
scholarly consideration, is the close proximity—even near-canonical similarity—that 
Machiavelli’s presented interpretations of human nature, the nature of God, and the 
nature of fortune, have to the traditions of orthodox Judeo-Christian religious thought and 
conventional Florentine Renaissance humanism.  
Human Nature  
 
At the very heart of Machiavelli’s ideology lies a specific, underlying belief about 
the nature of mankind upon which his subsequent political advice is built. Indeed, as we 
                                                
28 Black, Machiavelli, xxv. 
29 Ibid., 99.  
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have seen, it is often for his view of human nature that Machiavelli is most condemned. 
As Skinner notes: “the main reason for the shocking tone Machiavelli tends to employ 
lies in his deeply pessimistic view of human nature.”30 Black echoes this sentiment, 
asserting: “He was the first philosopher of misanthropy: for Machiavelli, there was not a 
spark of good in human nature.”31  
In order to analyze Machiavelli’s view of human nature, it is first necessary to 
expose the inherent duality present in nature as assumed by all medieval and Renaissance 
thinkers. To Machiavelli and these other theorists, human nature was to be understood as 
both innately designated and universally applicable.32 That is, humans as a species share 
a common nature, containing a general set of inborn, naturally-attributable 
predispositions that are fixed and universally applicable to all people across all places and 
times.33 Additionally, just as the whole of mankind shares a general nature, so also do 
                                                
30 Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 137.  
31 Black, Machiavelli, xviii.  
32 For a more thorough explanation of duality of nature and Machiavelli’s perception of 
it, see in this connection the excellent essay by Janet Coleman, “Machiavelli’s via 
moderna: Medieval and Renaissance Attitudes to History,” in Niccolò Machiavelli’s The 
Prince: New Interdisciplinary Essays, ed. by Martin Coyle (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995), 50-53. As Coleman rightly points out, in order to fully grasp 
Machiavelli’s view of nature, it is necessary to understand the conditions of historical 
analysis utilized and shared by all medieval and Renaissance thinkers, including 
Machiavelli: “It is important to realise that this medieval and Renaissance approach 
assumed and was aware of assuming two things. First, the world to be experienced is 
perceived to be as it is and is presumed to be as it was, that is, the world to be 
experienced is and always has been stable. This is what enables men to perceive certain 
conditions in the present and judge them to be similar to those in the past and hence, 
conditions are thought to repeat themselves…. Second, the human mind has fixed ways 
of operating when it experiences and considers experience. What varies over time is not 
the world that is experienced or mind in its understanding of experiences but language” 
(49; italics original).  
33 Cary J. Nederman, “Amazing Grace: Fortune, God, and Free Will in Machiavelli’s 
Thought,” in Journal of the History of Ideas 60, no. 4 (1999): 622.  
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people “possess ingrained individual characteristics,” creating “fixed patterns of personal 
conduct.”34  
For example, beginning in Chapter III of The Prince, entitled Composite 
principalities, Machiavelli immediately establishes the tenor of his analysis of humanity. 
Difficulties arise in new principalities, Machiavelli informs, particularly if it is a scion of 
former state, where:  
“Disorders there arise chiefly because of one natural difficulty always 
encountered in new principalities. What happens is that men willingly change 
their ruler, expecting to fare better. This expectation induces them to take up arms 
against him; but they only deceive themselves, and they learn from experience 
that they have made matters worse.”35  
From this warning, Machiavelli outlines his understanding of both aspects of human  
nature. Firstly, that men have specific, inborn characteristics, that he describes to be: 
fickleness, over-ambition, ingratitude, naivety, and discontent; and secondly, that they 
‘always’ occur, and are no less than ‘natural’ to all mankind, and thus natural to the states 
and principalities of which they comprise the populace.36 The Prince provides numerous 
explicit statements outlining Machiavelli’s opinion of human nature, or, more 
specifically, the deficiencies endemic to human nature. Taken together, these 
                                                
34 Ibid., 623. See in this connection also Coleman, “Machiavelli’s via moderna,” 53-57.  
35 The Prince, 3 (Bull, The Prince, 8). 
36 Machiavelli continues to hold this general view throughout his writing. For instance, 
see the persistence in the Preface to Book II of his Discourses: “Besides this, human 
appetites are insatiable, for since from nature they have had ability and the wish to desire 
all things and from fortune the ability to achieve few of them, there continually results 
from this a discontent in human minds and a disgust with the things they posses.” Except 
where noted, all references in English are to Discourses on Livy, trans. by Harvey C. 
Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), hereafter 
cited as Mansfield and Tarcov, Discourses, here 125. 
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characteristic traits of nature form the backbone of a topos prolific in the whole of the 
Machiavellian corpus, almost invariably emphasized when Machiavelli presents his 
precepts of political methodology.  
Continuing on in Chapter VI: New principalities acquired by one’s own arms and 
prowess, Machiavelli, explaining the difficulty of acquiring a principality, notes the 
“lukewarm support” forthcoming from those who could prosper under the new order as 
stemming: “partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the existing laws on their side, 
and partly because men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless 
they have tested them by experience.”37 So while men are prone to naivety and 
capricious, self-seeking desires, their actions and self-interest can also be heavily shaped 
by fear and an incredulous perception toward change. Because of these apprehensions, as 
he previously stated in the same chapter, instead: “men nearly always follow the tracks 
made by others and proceed in their affairs by imitation.”38 These beliefs are reiterated in 
the Discourses, serving to underpin a similar discussion on why “men always praise 
ancient times…and accuse the present”: “as men hate things either from fear or from 
envy, two very powerful causes of hared come to be eliminated in past things”.39  
In The Prince, Machiavelli goes on to synthesize these opinions in seeking to 
enunciate the necessity for all new princes to utilize force as well as persuasion: “That is 
why all armed prophets have conquered, and unarmed prophets have come to grief. 
Besides what I have said already the populace is by nature fickle; it is easy to persuade 
                                                
37 The Prince, 6 (Bull, The Prince, 21).  
38 Ibid., 6 (Bull, The Prince, 19). 
39 Discourses, II, Preface (Mansfield and Tarcov, Discourses, 123). 
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them of something, but difficult to confirm them in that persuasion.”40 Later, in doubtless 
one of the most oft referenced of his statements on human nature and highlighting his 
now-infamous contribution to the age-old question as to whether it is better for a prince 
to be loved or feared (Ch. XVII), Machiavelli reiterates almost verbatim these same 
deficient qualities in yet another bluntly acerbic summation: “One can make this 
generalization about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers, they shun 
danger and are greedy for profit; while you treat them well, they are yours….But when 
you are in danger they turn away.”41 
Machiavelli further reinforces this perception of human nature in Chapter XVII: 
Cruelty and compassion; and whether it is better to be loved than feared, or the 
reverse—this time emphasizing mankind’s characteristic gullibility: “Men are so simple, 
and so much creatures of circumstance, that the deceiver will always find someone ready 
to be deceived.”42 This sentiment is also echoed in the Discourses, where he notes: “For 
the generality of men feed on what appears as much as on what is; indeed, many times 
they are moved more by things that appear than by things that are.”43 The gullibility of 
men is heavily influenced by mankind’s subjugation to the senses. As he says later in The 
Prince: “Men in general judge by their eyes rather than their hands; because everyone is 
in a position to watch, few are in a position to come in close touch with you. Everyone 
sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are.”44 This results in 
judgments being made only on outcome: “In the actions of all men, and especially 
                                                
40 The Prince, 6 (Bull, The Prince, 21). 
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43Discourses, I, 25 (Mansfield and Tarcov, Discourses, 60).  
44 The Prince, 18 (Bull, The Prince, 58). 
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princes, where there is no court of appeal, one judges by the result.”45 “The common 
people are always impressed by appearances and results,” Machiavelli concludes—
exemplifying further the reasons why ‘men follow the tracks made by others’ who were 
successful and ‘proceed in their affairs by imitation.’46 
In my opinion, the most important statement in understanding Machiavelli’s view 
of human nature, and the subsequent political theology propounded in The Prince occurs 
in Chapter XVIII: How princes should honor their word. After describing why a prince 
should act like both the fox and the lion—as it is sometimes necessary for a prudent ruler 
to deceive others and break his word—thus revising Cicero’s metaphor,47 Machiavelli 
bases his defense on a single statement on human nature: “If all men were good, this 
precept would not be good; but because men are wretched creatures who would not keep 
their word to you, you need not keep your word to them.”48 Machiavelli makes very clear 
that his advice operates upon an ideology centered within the realm of experienced 
reality. This is the foundation he builds upon when he asserts later in the Discourses:  
“As all those demonstrate who reason on a civil way of life, and as every history 
is full of examples, it is necessary to whoever disposes a republic and orders laws 
in it to presuppose that all men are bad, and that they always have to use the 
malignity of their spirit whenever they have a free opportunity for it”.49 
While this might seem a detached, if not flippant, condemnation of humanity, 
Machiavelli’s expressed opinion of human nature is squarely scriptural. Beginning even 
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in Genesis, the first book of the Hebrew Torah and the Christian Bible, man is shown to 
be fickle, ungrateful, prone to lying, susceptible to deceit, and utterly wretched. Within 
the first three chapters of Genesis: Eve (the first woman) was deceived by the serpent; 
Adam (the first man), following her, disobeyed explicit orders from God; they hid 
themselves from God when He called; each cast blame on another when confronted with 
their sins; and were cast out of paradise.50 From then on, as Judeo-Christian theology 
teaches, all men were born with an inherent sin nature: “And God saw that the 
wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of 
his heart was only evil continually”; “Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my 
mother conceive me”; “God looked down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if 
there were any that did understand, that did seek God. Every one of them is gone back: 
they are altogether become filthy; there is none that doeth good, no, not one”; “The heart 
is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked: who can know it?”; “For out of the 
heart proceed evil thought, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, 
blasphemies.”51  
The apostle Paul, in his letter to the church in Romans, perhaps most effectively 
summarizes the inherent negativity of human nature as seen in Christian religion: 
“As it is written: There is none righteous, no, not one: There is none that 
understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the 
way, they are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no, not 
one. Their throat is an open sepulcher; with their tongues they have used deceit; 
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where noted, all English translations are from the King James Version [K.J.V.].) 
51 Genesis 6:5-6; Psalms 51:5; 53:3-4; Jeremiah 17:9; Matthew 15:19. 
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the poison of asps is under their lips: Whose mouth is full of cursing and 
bitterness: Their feet are swift to shed blood: Destruction and misery are in their 
ways: And the way of peace have they not known: There is no fear of God before 
their eyes.”52 
Here Paul points to nearly the same collection of characteristics as Machiavelli in 
explaining the nature of man. Similarly, Paul charges men as: naïve, lacking 
understanding, deceitful, liars, bitter, conceited, ungrateful, prone to their own destructive 
ways and ambition. And this fallen nature is both universal and inherently inborn. Paul 
goes on to famously conclude: “For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of 
God”.53  
This Christian doctrine, commonly referred to as “Original Sin,” was most 
famously promulgated by St. Augustine of Hippo. Developed largely through his debates 
against the Pelagians, Augustine’s articulation of original sin soon became a central pillar 
of Christian orthodoxy. As he writes in his treatise On Nature and Grace: “Man’s nature, 
indeed, was created at first faultless and without any sin…But the flaw which darkens 
and weakens all those natural goods, it has not contracted from its blameless 
Creator…but from that original sin, which it committed of its own free-will.”54 Similarly, 
St. Thomas Aquinas taught what can be called a “modified Augustinianism” position of 
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original sin.55 The Thomist position held the nature of original sin as consisting of the 
lack of original righteousness, passed on from Adam to his descendants by their natural 
birth.56 Such doctrines pervaded the understanding of medieval Christian theology, and 
later served to underpin precepts common to both the Calvinist and Lutheran schools of 
the Reformation.57 In his ponderous study on “the Fall” of man and the doctrine of 
original sin, Norman Powell Williams explains:  
“In the last analysis [before the Reformation] original sin—the sin of universal 
human nature as such, apart from the actual sins of individuals—is the only real 
sin that exists. Actual sin is regarded as being merely an epiphenomenon—a 
loathsome efflorescence of which the foul root is the inherent sinfulness of 
humanity.”58 
Thus, individual sins where simply scions of the natural human condition.  
Machiavelli’s opinion of human nature as expressed in The Prince, then, is largely 
similar to one of the defining doctrines of the Christian moral tradition, and wholly 
grounded in a specific religious interpretation found throughout the scriptures—
especially regarding how easily men are deceived, their wretchedness, and bad faith. In 
his Tercets on Ambition, Machiavelli explicates this understanding of human nature by 
painting an even more explicitly biblical, Augustinian view of the fall of man resulting in 
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an inborn sin-nature characterized by greed and covetousness.59 Speaking of the vices of 
“Ambition and Avarice,” Machiavelli decries: “When man was born into the world, they 
were born too; and if they had no existence, happy enough would be our condition.”60 
For, “hardly had God made the stars, the heavens, the light, the elements, and man—
master over so many things of beauty—and had quelled the pride of angels,” then man 
sinned, and “through them the quiet and happy life always lived in Adam’s dwelling with 
Peace and Charity took flight,” and God was forced to “[banish] Adam with his wife for 
their tasting of the apple” from “Paradise.”61 After the fall, Machiavelli continues, human 
nature became inherently wretched:  
“Oh human spirit insatiable, arrogant, crafty and shifting, and above all else 
malignant, iniquitous, violent and savage, because through your longing so 
ambitious, the first violent death was seen in the world, and the first grass red 
with blood…Not merely whatever good his enemy has, but what he seems to 
have—and so always the world has been, modern and ancient—every man 
values.”62  
This fallibility and inherently sinful nature of man as described by Machiavelli is a 
fundamental precept of orthodox Christian religion, as it leaves only God [and Christ, his 
son] as perfect and divine.  
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In fact, Machiavelli even uses the biblical story of Moses returning from Mt. Sinai 
to further illustrate the accuracy of his views on human nature. Moses is the first among 
the list of Machiavelli’s “armed prophets” in The Prince,63 and in the Discourses, 
Machiavelli goes on to explain: “that since he wished his laws and his orders to go 
forward, Moses was forced to kill infinite men who, moved by nothing other than envy, 
were opposed to his plans.”64 The story of Exodus 32, then, serves the dual-purpose of 
highlighting the fickleness and bad faith of men (in this case, the Israelites) and proving 
the necessity of force along with persuasion. In referring to this passage, J.G.A Pocock 
concedes: “Machiavelli’s language is irritatingly orthodox.”65  
 However, it is quite important to recognize that Machiavelli’s view of human 
nature is not, in fact, exclusively negative. In the Discourses, he makes plain that he 
considers ample goodness to exist in the world at large:  
“I judge the world to always have been in the same mode and there to have been 
as much good as wicked in it. But the wicked and the good vary from province to 
province, as is seen by one who has knowledge of those ancient kingdoms, which 
varied from one to another because of the variation of customs, though the world 
remained the same.”66  
As with varying proliferations of either goodness or wickedness geographically, so too  
Machiavelli views it in men—specifically as related to socio-economic class 
conditioning. Though throughout The Prince he continues to admonish the nature of 
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nobles—stating: “it is impossible to satisfy the nobles honourably,” as they “want to 
oppress the people,” and “always act in time to safeguard their interests, and they take 
sides with the one whom they expect to win”—he paints the nature of the people at large 
much more positively.67  
All through Chapter IX: The constitutional principality, Machiavelli continually 
asserts opinions related to the authentic and humble nature of the general populace. Here 
he notes that, unlike the nobles, a prince can, in fact, satisfy the people honorably, as: 
“the people are more honest in their intentions…they want only not to be oppressed.”68 
Machiavelli concludes the chapter by assuring that “a prince who builds his power on the 
people,” assuming they have followed his prescriptions and won their general allegiance: 
“will never be let down by the people; and he will be found to have established his power 
securely.”69  
 Another element of human nature according to Machiavelli is a love of freedom 
and liberty, especially as it relates to one’s own country. In his Art of War, Machiavelli 
makes it clear this is a characteristic inherent in mankind: “Love of country is caused by 
nature.”70 Likewise, Machiavelli upholds this opinion in The Prince, such as his warning 
in Chapter V: How cities or principalities which lived under their own laws should be 
administered after being conquered:  
“Whoever becomes the master of a city accustomed to freedom, and who does not 
destroy it, may expect to be destroyed himself; because, when there is a rebellion, 
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such a city justifies itself by calling on the name of liberty and its ancient 
institutions, never forgotten despite the passing of time and the benefits received 
from the new ruler. Whatever the conqueror’s actions or foresight, if the 
inhabitants are not dispersed and scattered, they will forget neither that name nor 
those institutions; and at the first opportunity they will at once have recourse to 
them.”71  
He ends the chapter by reinforcing his belief that the natural inclination of peoples who 
have experienced freedom is to seek to preserve it against tyranny: “But in republics there 
is more life, more hatred, a greater desire for revenge; the memory of their ancient liberty 
does not and cannot let them rest.”72 For a political critic who so ardently advocated the 
necessity of vigor, impetuosity, and manly action, this statement surely contains elements 
of praise injected into the platonic observation. 
So while man might be constituted of a ‘wretched nature,’ Machiavelli does not 
deny the possibility for this nature to also be supplemented with a simple humility and 
authentic virtues of loyalty, resolve, and perseverance of human spirit. This echoes the 
dictum he maintains in the Discourses: “[men] do not know how to be either altogether 
wicked or altogether good.”73 In a letter to Guicciardini years later, Machiavelli would 
once again reiterate this view of imperfect- but-not-irredeemable human nature, quipping: 
“You know—and anyone who knows how to reason about this world knows it, too—that 
the people are fickle and foolish; nevertheless, as fickle and foolish as they are, what 
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ought to be done is frequently what they say to do.”74 Far from ‘stripping away all innate 
human goodness,’75 then, Machiavelli allows for an inherently flawed nature to still 
produce positive—both morally virtuous and objectively successful—results. 
The Nature of God 
 
 Unlike his discussion of human nature, Machiavelli does not make many explicit 
references to the nature of God, or even the presence of God, in The Prince. This 
obviously leaves much more room for ambiguity and subjectivity when attempting to 
elucidate how Machiavelli understood the nature of God, but there is sufficient textual 
information between The Prince and the remainder of the Machiavellian corpus to 
fashion a general picture. Perhaps none have so eloquently summarized this endeavor as 
Sebastian de Grazia, who writes in his lauded book, Machiavelli in Hell: “Nowhere does 
our author discuss at length his conception of God. Scattered about his writings, though, 
like poppies in a field of chick peas, are many references to God. Together they form an 
unmistakable likeness.”76  
While scholars are in somewhat relative agreement on Machiavelli’s view of 
human nature, there is a far wider range of scholarly interpretation on the nature of 
Machiavelli’s God. As befitting his overall irreligious interpretation, Black sees the 
nature of Machiavelli’s God as: “impotent,” prone to “divine indifference to the moral 
order,” possibly lacking “divine omnipotence,” and most likely a deity that Machiavelli 
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himself regarded with disbelief.77 Viroli, in stark contrast, saw the nature of God for 
Machiavelli to be: based “in the tradition of republican Christianity that he experienced in 
Florence,” and so a God that “participates in human history, loves free republics, supports 
and rewards those who govern justly, created men in his own image, and wishes them to 
be like him with their virtue.”78 Viroli’s understanding of the nature of Machiavelli’s God 
is very similar to that of de Grazia, who contends:  
“Niccolò’s God is the creator, the master deity, providential, real, universal, one 
of many names, personal, invocable, thankable, to be revered, a judge, just and 
forgiving, rewarding and punishing, awesome, a force transcendent, separate from 
but operative in the world.”79  
And for his part, Geerken characterized the nature of God in Machiavelli as:  
“an aggressive, political deity, not the unmoved First Mover, uncaused First 
Cause, or First Being of a Thomas Aquinas. Machiavelli’s was a God with a 
libertarian agenda, a God who manifested himself in history by, among other 
things, speaking to men of virtù, potential agents like Moses.”80  
Similar to Viroli, de Grazia, and Geerken, I contend it is clear from The Prince 
that Machiavelli understood there to be a God. Machiavelli believed God to be the 
Creator, who had created man with a divinely inspired free will. Not only does God exist 
for Machiavelli, He actively intervenes in human affairs—aiding those He selects as 
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friends and punishing those who are His enemies. While he expressed that the divine plan 
might at times remain obscure to human reasoning, Machiavelli saw the scriptures and 
human history as explanation of how God operated in the world. Just and purposeful, 
Machiavelli’s God allows for the temporal functioning of actions and consequences in 
order for His creations to reap their rewards (or their consequences). 
The most explicit references to the nature of God in The Prince come in the final 
two chapters—XXV: How far human affairs are governed by fortune, and how fortune 
can be opposed; and XXVI: Exhortation to liberate Italy from the barbarians. Indeed, as 
Leo Strauss rightly notes concerning Chapter XXVI: “[Machiavelli] mentions God as 
often there as in all other chapters of the Prince taken together.”81 Beginning in the first 
sentence of Chapter XXV, Machiavelli tellingly separates the concepts of ‘fortune’ and 
‘God’, thereby denoting them as detached, delineated entities:  
“I am not unaware that many have held and hold the opinion that events are 
controlled by fortune and by God in such a way that the prudence of men cannot 
modify them, indeed, that men have no influence whatsoever. Because of this, 
they would conclude that there is no point in sweating over things, but that one 
should submit to the rulings of chance. This opinion has been more widely held in 
our own times, because of the great changes and variations, beyond human 
imagining, which we have experienced and experience every day. Sometimes, 
when thinking of this I myself have inclined to this same opinion. None the less, 
so as not to rule out our free will, I believe that it is probably true that fortune is 
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the arbiter of half the things we do, leaving the other half or so to be controlled by 
ourselves.”82 
Included in this passage as well is another essential element of Machiavelli’s view 
of  
human nature—namely, the presence of free will. Free will is a powerful force for 
Machiavelli, allowing for the prudence and ability to govern at least half of human 
actions, and allowing for the besting of fortune when actions are taken impetuously. 
Additionally, by reserving the potency of free will, Machiavelli also explains an element 
of the nature of God by allowing His creations to act of their own accord. An example of 
God allowing human free will and thus the influence of men occurs in Machiavelli’s 
earlier praising of Moses in Chapter VI. Explaining how a prudent prince should imitate 
great men “who became princes by their own abilities and not by good fortune,” 
Machiavelli states: “I say that the most outstanding are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, 
and others like them. Although one should not reason about Moses, since he merely 
executed what God commanded, yet he must be praised for the grace which made him 
worthy of speaking with God.”83 Even though God explicitly guided Moses, He still 
allowed for the personal abilities and virtues of Moses to lead him to temporal action and 
eventually glory.  
 Moving on to Chapter XXVI, or the ‘Exhortation’ as Viroli aptly calls it, the 
nature of God becomes much more apparent.84 The country of Italy: “beseeches God to 
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send someone to save her from those barbarous cruelties and outrages.”85 Machiavelli 
sees the possibility for the redemption of Italy resting with Lorenzo and the house of the 
Medici: “And at the present time it is impossible to see in what she can place more hope 
than in your illustrious House, which, with its fortune and prowess, favoured by God and 
by the Church, of which it is now the head, can lead Italy to her salvation.” Important 
here is the delineation Machiavelli makes between ‘God’ and the ‘Church.’ Implicit in 
this separation is the potential for the favor of God to be disparate from any ecclesiastical 
institution.  
This distinction between earthly representation of the Christian faith embodied by 
the Roman Catholic Church and the office of the papacy, and that of the eternal, divine 
figure of God is an essential element in Machiavelli’s religiosity. Pervading his writings, 
and occurring most frequently in the Discourses, is a current of criticism aimed at the 
state of the Church and religious observance in his contemporary age of Christendom that 
he sees partly guilty for the abrogation of the pursuit of virtù and the collapse of liberty. 
Many scholars, such as Black and Berlin, tend to assimilate the concepts of the Church, 
Christian practice, and God Himself when discussing these critiques, and thus point to 
this plaint as proof of Machiavelli’s wholly irreligious, anti-Christian attitude.86 
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However, when we consider the instances of rhetorical separation used here and 
elsewhere by Machiavelli, it becomes clear that he viewed the nature and deity of God as 
being separate from that of the Church, and very noticeably held different opinions and 
beliefs about each respectively.  
Machiavelli goes on to explain in the ‘Exhortation’ further elements of God’s 
nature. Speaking of the actions and lives of his cadre of great men led by Moses, 
Machiavelli assures Lorenzo: “Their enterprise was neither more just nor easier, and God 
was no more their friend than he is yours. There is great justice in our cause: ‘iustum 
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enim est bellum quibus necessarium, et pia arma ubi nulla nisi in armis spes est’”87 As de 
Grazia notes and neatly traces, the phrase used by Machiavelli denoting the friendship of 
God had a long and tangible tradition, running back to both the pagan and the religious.88 
Beginning in the late second and third centuries with the emergence of Christianity, 
Christian martyrs were called “friends of God”; in the fourth century beginning with 
Saint Anthony, celebrated ascetics and holy men too were “friends of God”; following 
the year 1000 A.D., “friend of God” was used to denote the extraordinarily pious and 
faithful believer and marvelous persons with saintly nature; groups in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth century in Germany and Switzerland called themselves “friends of God”; in 
1517, in the eighty-fourth of his Ninety-Five Theses, Martin Luther refers to “friendship 
with God”; Petrarch in fourteenth century Italy wrote in his reflections “On the Solitary 
Life” of secluded souls who are the “friends of God”; and in the fifteenth century, Fra 
Girolamo Savonarola used the phrase “friendship of God,” from his pulpit of San Marco 
in Florence (where Niccolò Machiavelli himself heard him preach).89 “The friend of God, 
then, has a long history, longer than that of the Christian church.”90  
Additionally, the phrase appears in Plato’s Republic, Latin literature such as 
Horace, and the writings of Epictetus (who applied it to himself). Machiavelli himself 
also used variants of this phrase in other of his writings: in the play Andria, his 
vernacular translation of Terence’s The Girl from Andros, one character is “loved by the 
Gods”; in the preface to Book II of his Discourses, Machiavelli writes of his hope that 
                                                
87 The Prince, 26 (Bull, The Prince, 83). The English translation reads: “Because a 
necessary war is a just war and where there is hope only in arms those arms are holy.” 
Here Machiavelli is quoting Livy from his History of Rome, IX.1. 
88 de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, 50-56. 
89 Ibid., 50-51. 
90 Ibid., 51. 
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one may be “more loved by Heaven”; and again in his Florentine Histories, he writes that 
Lorenzo the Magnificent “was loved by fortune and by God to the highest degree.”91  
Thomas Aquinas, the immensely influential Italian Dominican friar, theologian 
and philosopher, “misquotes” the very phrase from Exodus in his Summa Theologica, 
referring to it instead as ‘a friend of a friend’: “Hence it is written (Ex. 33:11) that the 
Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend.”92 Girolamo 
Savonarola, another Italian Dominican friar, was also reported to have talked with God, 
and thus was considered by some to be among His friends. Machiavelli himself wrote as 
much in a letter to Ricciardo Becchi following the former’s attending of Savonarola’s 
sermon on the Carnival day in San Marco: “He said that God had told him that there was 
someone in Florence who sought to make himself a tyrant”.93 In the Discourses, 
Machiavelli again reiterates this popularly-held assumption of Savonarola:  
“To the people of Florence it does not appear that they are either ignorant or 
coarse; nonetheless, they were persuaded by Friar Girolamo Savonarola that he 
spoke with God. I do not wish to judge whether this is true or not, because one 
should speak with reverence of such a man; but I do say that an infinite number 
                                                
91 Ibid., 52. See in this connection also Machiavelli, Discourses, II, Preface (Mansfield 
and Tarcov, Discourses, 125); idem Florentine Histories, VIII, 36 (Gilbert, Works, III, 
1433). 
92 Ibid., 54. De Grazia contends that this misquotation by Aquinas “thereby [emphasized] 
the reciprocity of God’s friendship with Moses. Aquinas continues, this is to be 
understood as expressing the opinion of the people, who thought that Moses was 
speaking with God, mouth to mouth.”; See in connection St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, IIa-IIae, q. 174, art. 4. trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(New York: Benziger Bros. ed., 1947; Project Gutenberg, 2006).  
93 Niccolò Machiavelli to Ricciardo Becchi, dated 9 March 1498 (Atkinson and Sices, 
Machiavelli and His Friends, 8-10).  
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believed him without having seen anything extraordinary to make them believe 
him.”94 
In Machiavelli’s comment on Savonarola, De Grazia is careful to point out: “the 
existence of the Deity or His ability to converse is not in question. Niccolò simply is not 
sure that the friar ever talked with Him.”95  
Further, this appellation draws from a scriptural tradition as well. The biblical 
figures of Abraham and Job are recorded as being friends of God: “And the scripture was 
fulfilled which saith, Abraham believed God, and it was imputed unto him for 
righteousness: and he was called the Friend of God”96; “Oh, for the days when I was in 
my prime, when God’s intimate friendship blessed my house”.97 David, though not 
expressly referred to as a ‘friend of God’, is spoken of quite similarly as being a man 
after God’s own heart: “And when he had removed him, he raised up unto them David to 
be their king; to whom also he gave testimony, and said, I have found David the son of 
Jesse, a man after mine own heart, which shall fulfil all my will.”98 The Apostle John was 
referred to as the “disciple whom Jesus loved”, and is later recorded as receiving a 
revelation from God Himself.99 Christ, too, conferred the title of friend upon the 
                                                
94 Discourses, I.II.5 (Mansfield and Tarcov, Discourses, 36).  
95 de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, 56. 
96 James 2:23. James is referencing Genesis 15:6: “And [Abraham] believed in the 
LORD; and he counted it to him for righteousness.” Again in Isaiah 41:8, Abraham is 
referred to as a friend of God: “But thou, Israel, art my servant, Jacob whom I have 
chosen, the seed of Abraham my friend.” Other references toward Abraham as a friend of 
God occur 2 Chronicles 20:7 and Romans 4:3.  
97 Job 29:4 (New International Version [N.I.V.]). 
98 Acts 13:22. Here the Apostle Paul is referencing the words of the Prophet Samuel from 
the book of 1 Samuel 13:14, who, speaking of David, declares: “the LORD hath sought 
him a man after his own heart, and the LORD hath commanded him to be captain over 
his people”. 
99 John 13:23. The Apostle John recorded his vision from God in the book of Revelation.  
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Disciples as they knew their ‘master’s business’ which he had elocuted to them from 
God: “Henceforth I call you not servants; for the servant knoweth not what his lord 
doeth: but I have called you friends; for all things that I have heard of my Father I have 
made known unto you.”100  
Most famously, and arguably most important for Machiavelli, the book of Exodus 
records Moses as being a friend of God: “And the LORD spake unto Moses face to face, 
as a man speaketh unto his friend.”101 Philologically, de Grazia explains, this phrase in its 
original Latin, ‘ad amicum suum,’ which Machiavelli would have read in the Vulgate or 
heard preached, seems the most likely source phrase that Machiavelli recast into his “God 
more a friend.”102 Machiavelli’s phrase used in The Prince, De Grazia emphasizes: “is 
original and stronger: it commits the affection of God unmistakably.”103 
So it is clear to Machiavelli and his audience that friendship with God is available 
to certain men, but how is this divine friendship to be achieved? Machiavelli goes on in 
the ‘Exhortation’ to explain the prerequisites for obtaining this friendship—and in doing 
so further illuminates what he understands to be the nature of God. Firstly, there will be 
provided an opportunity. Beginning this impassioned exhortation for Italian redemption, 
Machiavelli admits:  
“After deliberating on all the things discussed above, I asked myself whether in 
present-day Italy the times were propitious to honour a new prince, and whether 
the circumstances existed here which would make it possible for a prudent and 
capable man to introduce a new order, bringing honour to himself and prosperity 
                                                
100 John 15:15. 
101 Exodus 33:11. 
102 de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, 53. 
103 Ibid., 56. 
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to all the Italians. Well, I believe that so many things conspire to favour a new 
prince, that I cannot imagine there was ever a time more suitable than the 
present.”104 
Machiavelli, then, ‘cannot imagine’ a more suitable time for a new prince to arise than in 
present-day Italy—thus defining the setting of opportunity. In doing so, Machiavelli 
additionally defines the true purpose for the advice given throughout his treatise ‘on all 
the things discussed above’—namely, to aid a new prince in seizing this opportunity.  
He then goes on to list the underlying circumstances necessary for Moses, Cyrus, 
and Theseus to emerge as men who he singles out as friends of God in order to explain 
why he believes Italy is ripe for a savior:  
“And if, as I said, the Israelites had to be enslaved in Egypt for Moses to emerge 
as their forceful leader; if the Persians had to be oppressed by the Medes so that 
the greatness of Cyrus could be recognized; if the Athenians had to be scattered to 
demonstrate the excellence of Theseus: then, at the present time, in order to 
discover the worth of an Italian spirit, Italy had to be brought to her present 
extremity. She had to be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than 
the Persians, more widely scattered than the Athenians; leaderless, lawless, 
crushed, despoiled, torn, overrun; she had to have endured every kind of 
desolation.”105 
The same opportunity given to Moses et al. for friendship with God, therefore, has been 
                                                
104 The Prince, 26 (Bull, The Prince, 82). 
105 Ibid., 26 (Bull, The Prince, 82). 
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provided through the present state of Italy—indeed, even more so, in Machiavelli’s mind: 
“each of them had less opportunity than is offered now.”106 
Further, Machiavelli assures his reader that this opportunity is a just and 
achievable one. God does not call on men to do the impossible, and God does not grant 
His friendship to those pursuing unjust causes. Machiavelli first calls attention to the 
prayers of his kinsmen: “See how Italy beseeches God to send someone to save her from 
those barbarous cruelties and outrages; see how eager and willing the country is to follow 
a banner, if only someone will raise it.”107 Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus “may be 
exceptional and remarkable”, Machiavelli concedes, but, assuredly, “they were men none 
the less”.108 What’s more: “Their enterprise was neither more just nor easier”.109 
Machiavelli goes on to emphasize again the “great justice in our cause”, quoting the 
famed historian Livy: “Because a necessary war is a just war and where there is hope 
only in arms those arms are holy.”110 He concludes: “There is the greatest readiness, and 
where that is so there cannot be great difficulty…all things have conspired to your 
greatness”.111 
                                                
106 Ibid., 26 (Bull, The Prince, 83). 
107 Ibid., 26 (Bull, The Prince, 82). 
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questioning the divinity of the Lord or the allegorical teachings of the Bible, 
[Machiavelli] is attributing literal historical value to the Old Testament just as he might 
do with Livy or any other classical historian.” See Machiavelli in Hell, 54.  
109 Ibid., 26 (Bull, The Prince, 83). 
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111 Ibid., 26 (Bull, The Prince, 83). 
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Elsewhere, however, a seemingly different understanding of “friend of God” 
occurs in Machiavelli. In his Florentine Histories, Machiavelli invokes this appellation 
while addressing the indiscernibility of God’s will. Beyond simply standing removed and 
thus allowing corrupt and powerful men to freely oppress the citizenry, Machiavelli 
considers how it can even appear that God actively aides those pursuing evil ends:  
“And even if ambition blinds you, the whole world as witness to your wickedness 
will open your eyes; God will open them for you, if perjuries, if violated faith and 
betrayals displease Him, and if He does not always wish to be the friend of 
wicked men, as up to now He has done for some hidden good.”112 
At times, Machiavelli expresses, it seems God has ‘been a friend’ to wicked men. But 
how can this be if, as proposed here, God’s friendship requires a just cause?  
For his part, Black sees this reference as denoting Machiavelli’s rejection of 
divine power altogether, saying: “Atheism is one conceivable implication of divine 
indifference to the moral order posited by Machiavelli.”113 However, Black’s analysis 
omits any consideration of what Machiavelli writes immediately following:  
“So do not promise yourself sure victory, for that will be kept from you by the 
just wrath of God…And even if our sins have yet been such that we have fallen 
into your hands against every wish of ours, have firm faith that the kingdom you 
have begun with deceit and infamy will come to an end for you or your sons with 
disgrace and harm.”114 
                                                
112 Niccolò Machiavelli, Florentine Histories, VI, 20, trans by. Laura F. Banfield and 
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 252.  
113 Black, Machiavelli, 253.   
114 Florentine Histories, VI, 20 (Banfield and Mansfield, Florentine Histories, 252). 
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Machiavelli emphatically assures that while it might appear that God has allowed wicked 
men to reign over the good, this is not the final outcome. As His nature is supremely just, 
He will ultimately punish those who are deserving of His wrath. Despite the possible 
appearance of divine friendship, those who act wholly in deceit and infamy, who commit 
perjury and betray God displease Him, and will be judged accordingly.  
Further, Black’s charge of implicit atheism utterly disregards Machiavelli’s 
admission that it was human error, ‘our sins,’ that were the cause of Florence’s 
oppression, not any malevolent action of God. Because of sins committed through the 
exercise of human free-will, (which, as we have seen, is in itself divinely inspired), God 
justly permitted the resulting consequences of those sins to afflict the Florentines. This is 
a lesson repeated throughout the scriptures, particularly in the Old Testament. When the 
Israelites sinned through disbelief and turned away from God, He punished them to 
wander the wilderness for forty years:  
“Because all those men which have seen my glory, and my miracles, which I did 
in Egypt and in the wilderness, and have tempted me now these ten times, and 
have not hearkened to my voice; Surely they shall not see the land which I sware 
unto their fathers, neither shall nay of them that provoked me see it.”115 
Despite having held special favor as God’s chosen nation, being saved from Egypt and 
witness to countless miracles, Israel sinned and God punished them. Likewise, 
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Machiavelli writes of Florence in the same way—a nation that considered itself to be 
favored by God as well.116  
The moral order, then, that Machiavelli posits here is not one promoting atheism, 
or even declaring divine indifference—in fact it is wholly the opposite. Even when 
writing of his beloved country’s suffering, Machiavelli still clearly enunciates a firm 
belief that although he does not understand the divine plan, he faithfully understands that 
God must be acting ‘for some hidden good.’ When compared with what he writes in the 
The Prince regarding oppression, this ‘hidden good’ manifests itself for Machiavelli in 
the form of opportunity for friendship with God. As he writes in the ‘Exhortation’:  
“And if, as I said, the Israelites had to be enslaved in Egypt for Moses to emerge 
as their forceful leader…then, at the present time, in order to discover the worth 
of an Italian spirit, Italy had to be brought to her present extremity. She had to be 
more enslaved than the Hebrews…she had to have endured every kind of 
desolation.”117 
The subjugation of Italy provides the same opportunity as was given to Moses and the 
other friends of God, whose enterprises were neither: “more just nor easier, and God was 
no more their friend than he is yours.”118 
 Having established opportunity, one that is both just and achievable, as the first 
necessity for friendship with God, Machiavelli then supplies the second—action. “The 
rest is up to you,” Machiavelli declares, “God does not want to do everything Himself, 
                                                
116 See in this connection Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965), 44. For further exploration of the Florentines’ 
understanding of religion in politics, see 50-51 below. 
117 The Prince, 26 (Bull, The Prince, 82). 
118 Ibid., 26 (Bull, The Prince, 83). 
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and take away from us our free will and our share of the glory which belongs to us.”119 
Here again is a further emphasis from Machiavelli on the presence of free will 
characterizing human nature and determining actions and outcomes. Not only, then, did 
God give us free will, it is a thing He does not want to take away. As we have divinely-
ordained free will, and God does not wish to strip His creation of this element of their 
nature, He then expects us to act: ‘God does not want to do everything Himself.’  
It is for this reason that Machiavelli is able to praise Moses as he does previously 
in Chapter VI, saying: “Although one should not reason about Moses, since he merely 
executed what God commanded, yet he must be praised for the grace which made him 
worth of speaking with God.”120 This statement, far from paradoxical, first gives 
deference to the power of God and concedes the inability of humans to reason about Him 
fully, while at the same time explaining why Moses is to be praised and imitated by 
prudent men because his actions and institutions made him worthy of God’s friendship.121   
                                                
119 Ibid., 26 (Bull, The Prince, 83). 
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121 Considering this statement on Moses in Ch. VI of The Prince, John H. Geerken has 
argued a more literary and rhetorical angle rather than the interpretation I have just 
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‘Exhortation’ concluding chapter.  
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In the Christian scriptural tradition, the need for action as a requirement for 
friendship with God is thoroughly documented. Abraham was only granted divine 
friendship after first taking action, as God Himself tells Abraham’s son, Isaac:  
“Sojourn in this land, and I will be with thee, and will bless thee; for unto thee, 
and unto thy seed, I will give all these countries, and I will perform the oath 
which I sware unto Abraham thy father… Because that Abraham obeyed my 
voice, and kept my charge, my commandments, my statutes and my laws.”122 
This promise to Abraham by God was first made after Abraham had followed divine 
command and acted upon his instruction to sacrifice his son Isaac. Though God 
ultimately intervened and spared the life of Isaac, Genesis 22 shows the faithful action 
taken by Abraham: “And they came to the place which God had told him of; and 
Abraham built an altar there, and laid the wood in order, and bound Isaac his son, and 
laid him on the altar upon the wood. And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the 
knife to slay his son.”123 It was only after acting upon his faith in God that Abraham’s son 
was spared, and friendship of God granted. 
 Far more important for Machiavelli, Moses was only granted his divine friendship 
after acting to preserve God’s commandments, statutes and laws. Even before God first 
spoke to Moses through the burning bush,124 Moses, then a prince of Egypt, had acted to 
save a Hebrew from being beaten by an Egyptian: “[Moses] spied an Egyptian smiting an 
Hebrew, one of his brethren. And he looked this way and that way, and when he saw that 
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there was no man, he slew the Egyptian, and hid him in the sand.”125 Similarly, it was 
only after Moses had begged for divine mercy for the rebellious nation of Israel, and then 
acted himself to protect the law by ordering the Levites to kill the idolatrous among them 
that Exodus records Moses spoke with God face to face as a friend.126  
 Throughout the Old and New Testament of the Bible, action is a central part of 
keeping the covenant of God. It was spoken of by the prophet Daniel, (whom Machiavelli 
was known to have referenced127): “And such as do wickedly against the covenant shall 
he corrupt by flatteries: but the people that do know their God shall be strong, and do 
exploits.”128 Speaking of Abraham, who was called “the Friend of God,” James reiterates 
the necessity of action: “Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and not by 
faith only…For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead 
also.”129 Even Christ, when preaching his Sermon on the Mount, instructs action: “Let 
your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your 
Father which is in heaven.”130 
When Machiavelli states ‘God does not want to do everything Himself,’ he is 
quite obviously expressing his belief for the requirement for human action. But 
contingent in this precept is also the undeniable belief that God is doing a portion 
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127 For example, Machiavelli references the figure of Daniel in a lighthearted poem 
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in order not to make the maggots starve, we shall repeat a word after Daniel, since 
perhaps already there is something that he reads, because, eating only bread and knife, we 
have got beaks that seem like those of woodcocks, and hardly hold our eyes half open.” 
Most likely in reference to Daniel 10. See in this connection the poem entitled “A Sonnet 
to Messer Bernardo His Father On the Farm at San Casciano” in Gilbert, Works, II, 1012. 
128 Daniel 11:32. 
129 James 2:23, 24, 26. 
130 Matthew 5:16. 
 46 
Himself, taking an active role on behalf of His friend. This is shown by his use of the 
word ‘everything’ (ogni cosa, in the original Italian), as opposed to ‘anything’ or 
‘nothing.’ Machiavelli assures: ‘As well as this, unheard-of wonders are to be seen, 
performed by God.’ Invoking the Bible, Machiavelli goes on to list miracles done in 
Exodus by God in helping ‘His friend’, Moses: “the sea is divided, a cloud has shown 
you the way, water has gushed from the rock, it has rained manna.”131 Because God was 
a friend to Moses, He acted on his behalf and performed miracles to aid in the 
emancipation of his people from the bonds of slavery and the heel of tyranny.  
Therefore, Machiavelli’s God is by nature an active deity, or, at the very least, 
willing to act when it is deserved through aiding men of virtue. It is only ‘the rest’ God 
requires of those He would grant His friendship. This, too, God does for specific 
reasons—not wishing to ‘take away from us our free will’ and not wanting to take away: 
“our share of the glory which belongs to us.”132 Machiavelli concludes: ‘all things have 
conspired to your greatness.’ ‘Greatness’ and ‘our share of the glory which belongs to 
us,’ then, are things acceptable, ordained, and reserved for humanity by God. He goes on 
to declare: “And nothing brings a man greater honour than the new laws and new 
institutions he establishes. When these are soundly based and bear the mark of greatness, 
they make him revered and admired.”133 Throughout the ‘Exhortation’, Machiavelli 
paints a personal interpretation of a God who is purposeful, a God who operates in a 
manner that is at least somewhat understandable by human reasoning, and a God who 
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132 Ibid., 26 (Bull, The Prince, 83). 
133 Ibid., 26 (Bull, The Prince, 83). 
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allows for the temporal functioning of actions and consequences in order for His 
creations to reap what they sow. 
Here Machiavelli falls squarely into the tradition of Christian Renaissance 
humanists who understood free will to be a divinely imbued element of human nature. 
For example, in his The Remedies of Both Kinds of Fortune, Petrarch became the first 
humanist to treat explicitly the theme of ‘the dignity of man,’ which retained the 
fundamental framework of Christian religion.134 Skinner summarizes Petrarch’s 
influential contention that: “alone of all creation, man may be said to have the capacity to 
control his own destiny.”135 Petrarch writes of the special status man holds in creation: 
“for unless you have willingly submitted to the yoke of sin, you may have dominion over 
all things which are under the heavens.”136 Unlike all other things, God created man in 
His own image—complete with a discerning free will, and without constraint on action. 
Similarly, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola contended in his Oration on the Dignity of Man 
that this meant God had placed man at the center of the world, and thus desired that man 
would craft his own outcome.137 Using the perspective of God, Pico explains:  
“We have set thee at the world’s center…We have made thee…so that with 
freedom of choice and with honor, as though the maker and molder of thyself, 
thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have 
the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt 
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have the power, out of thy soul’s judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, 
which are divine.”138  
Like these humanists, then, Machiavelli is advocating action from a biblically-defined 
framework of human nature—namely, one that is characterized by divinely-granted free 
will, and granted consequences or rewards accordingly.   
 As has been countlessly argued, the requirement of action is a central tenet 
throughout the entirety of Machiavelli’s political advice. Neal Wood, in his influential 
essay, aptly termed this position the “humanism of action,” and upheld it as the third rung 
of Machiavelli’s humanism.139 What has been largely missed by scholarship (including 
Wood),140 however, is Machiavelli’s contention that action is necessary not only for 
overcoming fortune, preserving the rule of the prince, and achieving worldly honor and 
glory, but it is also an inseparable requirement for upholding the will, laws, and covenant 
of God, and therefore has the capacity to additionally be religiously motivated and 
theologically compatible. Machiavelli reiterates this belief again in The Ass:  
“To believe that without effort on your part God fights for you, while you are idle 
and on your knees, has ruined many kingdoms and states. There is assuredly need 
for prayers; and altogether mad is he who forbids people their ceremonies and 
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their devotions; because in fact it seems that from them may be reaped union and 
good order; and on them in turn rests good and happy fortune. But there should be 
no one with so small a brain that he will believe, if his house is falling, that God 
will save it without any other prop, because he will die beneath that ruin.”141 
Black—while acknowledging that here Machiavelli is “once more” upholding “a 
political religion, stressing the need for divine observance to maintain civic well-
being”—interprets these remaining lines as evidence of Machiavelli’s further digression 
away from religion: “Machiavelli’s emphasis on God’s impotence hints that his religious 
skepticism had made the cosmic leap beyond anticlericalism and anti-christianism to 
atheism.”142 However, this analysis fundamentally misses Machiavelli’s intended target. 
Machiavelli here is not addressing God at all; rather he is ‘once again’ decrying the idle, 
passive religious observance of men.143 Just as he contends that a strong state requires 
good arms and good laws,144 and a great general must be skilful as a commander and an 
orator,145 Machiavelli believes that proper religious activity requires both prayer and 
action, devotion and operation. To Machiavelli action is clearly commanded by God, and 
thus those who have acted justly to redeem their state have earned His friendship, seen 
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 50 
Him intervene on their behalf by performing ‘unheard-of wonders’, and won their 
rightful share of honor and glory as granted through divine imprimatur.146  
Nature of Fortune 
 
By now it should be generally clear what were Machiavelli’s views on human 
nature and on the nature of God underpinning the advice of The Prince. It remains, then, 
to briefly explore the nature of fortune (or fortuna, in the original Italian)—the third 
element at play in determining the outcome of human endeavors. Cary J. Nederman 
refers to fortune as the “certainly best known” of Machiavelli’s list of “contributing 
factors that largely, if not entirely, account for the tumultuous events of human 
government (and presumably every other human enterprise),” and undeniably, the 
scholarship dedicated to this concept of fortuna is voluminous.147  
It is first necessary to consider the intellectual tradition of fortune in Renaissance 
Florence. Fortune was, at its best, an abstract concept comprised of many facets.148 In his 
study on the history and developments of intellectual thought in sixteenth-century 
Florence, Felix Gilbert introduces fortuna as: “the term symbolizing the world of non-
rational forces…Fortuna was responsible for those events which happened against all 
                                                
146 For a further discussion of glory and honor, see 44-46, 50 below. 
147 See in this connection Nederman, “Amazing Grace,” 621. Other scholarship focusing 
on Machiavelli and fortuna includes: Thomas Flanagan, “The Concept of Fortuna in 
Machiavelli,” in The Political Calculus, ed. by Anthony Parel; Hannah F. Pitkin, Fortune 
is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolò Machiavelli (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989); Oded Balaban, “The Human Origins of Fortuna,” in 
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148 See in this connection Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 40. 
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rational calculations and expectations.”149 Classically, Fortuna was worshiped by the 
Romans as a goddess and daughter of Jupiter.150 As Skinner summarizes:  
“[The Romans] always conceded her a great power over human affairs, portraying 
her with a wheel on which the fates of men are kept turning by her sheer caprice. 
They insisted, however, that her sway is not inexorable, since she can always be 
wooed and even subdued by a man of true [virtue].”151  
This classical belief was revived by the humanists, whom, like the Romans before 
them, envisioned the nature of the human predicament as: “a struggle between man’s will 
and fortune’s willfulness.”152 To the Florentines and other Renaissance humanists, the 
concept of fortune still preserved many of the characteristics that defined the nature of the 
pagan goddess. As noted by Gilbert: “She is a personality, she has her whims; she 
interferes arbitrarily in human affairs. Some men she dislikes, on others she smiles.”153  
Such elements are found in Machiavelli’s conception of fortune. Beginning in 
Chapter I: How many kinds of principality there are and the ways in which they are 
acquired of The Prince, Machiavelli follows in the footsteps of his fellow humanists and 
pairs fortune with virtue:154 “Dominions so acquired…a prince wins them…either by 
                                                
149 Ibid., 40.  
150 Skinner, Foundations of Political Thought, 95. See in this connection as well Howard 
R. Patch, The Tradition of the Goddess Fortuna in Medieval Philosophy and Literature, 
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fortune or by prowess.”155 For Machiavelli, fortune plays a large role in determining the 
outcome of human affairs. As he maintains in The Prince:  “I believe that it is probably 
true that fortune is the arbiter of half the things we do, leaving the other half or so to be 
controlled by ourselves.”156 Fortune can be an ally: Machiavelli counts it as one of the 
ways a prince can win dominion157; and it can be a foe: as seen with the case of Cesare 
Borgia.158 In the dedicatory letter beginning The Prince, Machiavelli accredits fortune as 
at once promoting the greatness of Lorenzo dé Medici while at the same time working 
against himself unrelentingly159: “[Your Magnificence] will discover in it my urgent wish 
that you reach the eminence that fortune and your other qualities promise you…you will 
realize the extent to which, undeservedly, I have to endure the great and unremitting 
malice of fortune.”160 
Above all fortune is capricious, and therefore not to be trusted nor relied upon by 
prudent men. Thus, in The Prince, Machiavelli advises: “the less a man has relied on 
fortune the stronger he has made his position.”161 He continues in Chapter VII: New 
principalities acquired with the help of fortune and foreign arms to disparage the nature 
of fortune, asserting that those who: “become princes purely by good fortune do so with 
little exertion on their own part; but subsequently they maintain their position only by 
                                                
155 The Prince, 1 (Bull, The Prince, 7). In his translation, Gilbert uses the words “strength 
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156 The Prince, 25 (Bull, The Prince, 79). 
157 Ibid., 7 (Bull, The Prince, 22). 
158 Ibid., 7 (Bull, The Prince, 23).  
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161 Ibid., 6 (Bull, The Prince, 20). 
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considerable exertion.”162 This precept is reiterated in Discourses: “So the good is 
acquired only with difficulty unless you are aided by fortune, so that with its force it 
conquers this ordinary and natural inconvenience.”163 For this reason, he praises Moses, 
Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus as the “most outstanding” examples because they became 
princes by their own prowess and not through fortune:  
“And when we have come to examine their actions and lives, they do not seem to 
have had from fortune anything other than opportunity. Fortune, as it were, 
provided the matter but they gave it its form; without opportunity their prowess 
would have been extinguished, and without such prowess the opportunity would 
have come in vain”164  
As has been argued, opportunity is required to achieve the friendship of God. In 
the  
‘Exhortation’, Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus were all friends of God because they acted 
with virtue in confronting their respective opportunities. Here, then, Machiavelli 
seemingly grants fortune a vital role in this spiritual equation—providing opportunity. If 
we return to the Renaissance intellectual tradition, we find that such a divine 
appropriation of fortune was in fact a widely-held belief. 
While, as we have seen, the Renaissance understanding of fortune retained 
similarities to its pagan origin, at the same time this revival was being carried out by 
Christian theorists operating in a Christin world, and thus the goddess was integrated into 
                                                
162 Ibid., 7 (Bull, The Prince, 22). 
163 Discourses, III, 37 (Mansfield and Tarcov, Discourses, 294). 
164 The Prince, 6 (Bull, The Prince, 20). 
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a religious worldview.165 Though “the recovery of this classical dramatization of the 
human condition [represented] an almost Pelagian departure from the prevailing 
assumptions of Augustinian Christianity” and “hallmarks of medieval moral and political 
thought,” it was done by thoroughly Christian humanists, such as Petrarch and his 
successors, who continued to insist on fundamental Christian doctrines.166 Being 
integrated into a Christian world meant that fortune was separate from providence and 
under the power and will of God. This did not mean that God could not use fortune, 
however. As de Grazia explains: “[Fortune] was still a pagan deity, but Supreme God was 
above her, and consequently she had to be carrying out His will. Beyond this, the 
relationship remained indefinite.”167 Gilbert, too, notes the ambiguity in this relationship, 
saying that for the Florentines: “God rules everything on this earth and thus it is not 
possible clearly to distinguish between what is done by God and what is done by 
Fortuna.”168 
But while it was not always discernable when fortune was operating for God’s 
will, God always sat alone atop the divine panoply.169 Often, as Gilbert traces, the 
Florentines saw fortune as serving a divine purpose: “Fortuna is God’s messenger and 
He directs her. Thus God can ‘change fortune.’”170 God could use fortune to act as a sign 
to show an opportunity where He was willing to help.171 Implying this work of Gilbert, 
de Grazia similarly notes: “The language of Florentine citizens as preserved in the 
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records of government meetings around the turn of the fifteenth century shows that their 
conception, too, was that Fortuna was God’s aide or minister, and that she was to be 
identified with His direction or wishes.”172  
Though Augustine, Aquinas, and many of their medieval successors had 
attempted to repudiate the Roman understanding of the goddess Fortuna, various other 
Christian theorists and exegetes had created ample space within the religious tradition for 
such an understanding of fortune as is found in Machiavelli. Patch, in his influential study 
of the medieval tradition of the goddess Fortuna, explored the two great conceptions of 
Fortuna in the Middle Ages—that is, the pagan and the Ecclesiastical. On the one hand, 
Augustine and Aquinas comprised the most influential interpretations of the 
Ecclesiastical understanding of fortune, forbidding all treatment of fortune as pagan 
heresy. Patch summarizes this view as completely “annihilating” fortune.173 However, 
other Christian writers, such as Boethius and Albertus Magnus, sought to enunciate an 
interpretation that acted as a reconciliation between the classical treatment of fortune with 
and Christian doctrine. Patch describes fortune in these compromise interpretations as 
being: “retained with a supreme God above her, —their relations are not exactly definite, 
but obviously she must be in part fulfilling His will.”174  
The union of these two great conceptions Patch found to rest with the: “poetic 
vision of Dante, who solves the problem of Fortuna without a compromise and with 
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conclusions satisfactory to both opinions.”175 According to Patch, Dante’s treatment of 
the “complete Christian Fortuna”:  
“is a fusion of the old traits of the pagan goddess with Christian doctrine. Fortuna 
is pagan and Boethian in that she embodies the pagan whimsicality in outward 
manner and yet is subordinate to a greater Deity; she does not award necessarily 
according to merit, and yet her madness had method because she is obeying the 
decrees of a superior will.”176 
 Beyond medieval theorists, later Renaissance humanists also considered the 
ambiguous relationship between fortune and providence.177 Coluccio Salutati, chancellor 
of the Florentine Republic from 1375 until his death in 1406, serves as one influential 
example.178 As noted by Trinkaus, fortune for Salutati was not relegated to “mere chance 
or mere contingency,” but was rather an: “intrusion of the preternatural, or the 
pretervolunary into experiences.” Trinkaus goes on to explicate:  
“For Salutati…fortune is a concrete notion by which the process of divine 
intervention outside of the regular course of nature or the play of human wills 
may be designated. It is a manifestation of God’s potentia absoluta, which is also 
evident in His revelation when contra-natural means of instruction are resorted 
to.”179 
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Therefore, Salutati understood fortune to be: an element outside out rational human 
action; something subservient to the will of God; and held the potential to act as an 
exhibition or signal of divine intervention outside the normal course of human endeavors. 
Additionally, Salutati did not consider it improper, irreligious, or blasphemous to imagine 
fortune as a goddess, but rather as a symbolic representation of: “the demonic power by 
which providence manages our affairs.”180  
Machiavelli’s conception of the nature of fortune contained many of these 
characteristic strands of the Christian intellectual tradition. As Nederman emphasizes: 
“That some plan or wisdom stands behind fortune forms an article of faith in 
Machiavelli’s thought. Even if the scheme cannot be discerned (hence, the arbitrary 
appearance of fortune to most men at most times), it is present.”181 Similar to the dual-
capacity for both good and evil within his understanding of human nature, Machiavelli 
likewise allows for the nature of fortune to be not only malevolent, but also divinely 
inspired. In the final chapter of The Prince, Machiavelli assures his Medici audience: “at 
the present time it is impossible to see in what [Italy] can place more hope in than in your 
illustrious House, which, with its fortune and prowess, favoured by God and by the 
Church…can lead Italy to her salvation.”182 Here Machiavelli includes fortune alongside 
prowess [virtue] as advantageous components linked to the favor of God.  
In the Discourses, Machiavelli again invokes the role of fortune in conjunction 
with divine selection:  
                                                                                                                                            
intervention, i.e.: creation, miracles, immediate revelation, inspiration, and regeneration. 
See in this definition Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (London: T. Nelson 
and Sons, 1873), I, 10, 412.  
180 Ibid., 99. 
181 Nederman, “Amazing Grace,” 628. 
182 The Prince, 26 (Bull, The Prince, 82). 
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“Hence men who commonly live amid great troubles or successes deserve less 
praise or less blame, because most of the time we see that they have been pushed 
into a destructive or an elevated action by some great advantage that the Heavens 
have bestowed on them, giving them opportunity—or taking it from them—to 
work effectively. Skillfully Fortune does this, since she chooses a man, when she 
plans to bring to pass great things, who is of so much perception and so much 
ability that he recognizes the opportunities she puts before him.”183 
Within this passage, Machiavelli tellingly asserts that it is God (‘the Heavens’) who gives 
advantage and provides opportunity, and that fortune functions as the mechanism 
carrying out a greater divine design. Further, it continues the delineation of the nature of 
fortune as seen in Salutati and others within the Christian tradition: fortune operates 
outside of man’s rational sphere, it is secondary to the will of God, and it can act on 
behalf of and in accordance with a divine plan by providing a test in the form of 
opportunity.  
Even as Machiavelli holds out hope for a providential purpose behind the actions 
of fortune, however, he does concede that the human mind cannot ultimately grasp the 
nature of a divine plan if it is not made clear to him. This is why the outcome of politics 
is often arbitrary and confusingly unpredictable. Machiavelli echoes this uncertainty 
when reasoning about a divine plan later in his Florentine Histories. When considering 
the actions of Florence in the 1460s, Machiavelli writes that it seemed God had 
abandoned the city to vengeful nobles, who: “increased power for themselves and terror 
to the others; they exercised this power without any hesitation and so conducted 
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themselves that it appeared that God and fortune had given them that city in prey.”184 
Here Machiavelli concedes a lack of divine intervention that he does not claim to 
understand; only that the misery of Florence’s current situation made it ‘appear’ as if God 
had forsaken them. It also functioned for Machiavelli as a historical example that God, 
for His own purposes, does not always intervene.  
Far from disbelieving or irreligious, even such thoroughly Christian thinkers as 
Augustine, “an extreme champion of providential design,” understood the limits of 
human rationality as it related to discerning the will of God.185 In his Retractations, 
Augustine first reiterates his understanding of fortune, which, as we have seen, he 
associates with “divine Providence” before explaining: “What is commonly referred to as 
fortune is governed by a certain hidden order, and in events, we do not term anything 
‘chance’ unless its reason and cause are unknown.”186 In other words, chance occurrences 
or random happenstance are ruled by the will of God, which is hidden from human 
understanding.  
And just as Machiavelli similarly contended that the divine plan was obscured to 
the human mind, so too was the nature of fortune’s participation. While God could and 
did use fortune for His own purposes, this did not mean for Machiavelli that fortune was 
always acting as a divine instrument. Fortune remained something ambiguous and multi-
faceted: on the one hand able to be utilized by God as an operating framework 
determining the intercession of divine grace, while at the same time entirely capable of 
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playing its own capricious role in determining human affairs. As he writes in The Prince: 
“I say that we see that some princes flourish one day and come to grief the next, without 
appearing to have changed in character or any other way.”187 The conclusion Machiavelli 
at which arrives lays the blame squarely on the caprice of fortune: “This I believe arises, 
namely,…that those princes who are utterly dependent on fortune come to grief when 
their fortune changes.”188 
 For this reason, Machiavelli warns against dependence on fortune, and advocates 
for prudent, impetuous action when attempting to subdue her. He did, however, continue 
to maintain that man should never count out the possibility that fortune was favoring him 
with an opportunity for glory. As Machiavelli exhorts in the Discourses: “[Men] should 
indeed never give up for, since they do not know [fortune’s] end and it proceeds by 
oblique and unknown ways, they have always to hope and, since they hope, not to give 
up in whatever fortune and in whatever travail they may find themselves.”189  
Nature of Purpose 
 
Before turning to the specific methods and observations Machiavelli provides in 
The Prince for obtaining political success, it is first necessary to briefly consider yet 
another of his definitions of nature—this time the nature of purpose. The nature of 
purpose in Machiavelli should be seen both personally and generally. Firstly, Machiavelli 
had a personal, authorial purpose in writing The Prince as well as his other works. 
Secondly, his various treatises on government also contained within them a political 
purpose—what I will call a goal of politics.  
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However, these two purposes need not be mutually exclusive; indeed, especially in the 
case of Machiavelli, they should not be so considered. For, if he was anything, 
Machiavelli was above all a man who was dedicated to his patria [fatherland]. As he had 
written in 1527 only a short time before his death, in a letter to Francesco Vettori, one of 
his oldest and most-trusted friends: “I love my native city more than my own soul.”190  
Despite his obvious republicanism,191 occurring most clearly and emphatically 
later in his Discourses, Machiavelli penned The Prince in order to advise a new a prince. 
As he writes in his dedicatory letter to Lorenzo dé Medici192: “So, Your Magnificence, 
take this little gift in the spirit in which I send it; and if you read and consider it 
diligently, you will discover in it my urgent wish that you reach the eminence that fortune 
and your other qualities promise you.”193 In purpose as well as form, The Prince stands as 
one among many: this, his most infamous work, marked Machiavelli’s contribution to a 
long-standing genre of political treatises intended specifically as “advice-books”194 for 
princes, a genus Allan Gilbert calls: “de regimine principum,” or rather, “the prince.”195  
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Contrary to what some have argued196, Machiavelli’s goals were largely no-
different from the advice-books of other humanists, or even from the earlier works of 
‘mirror-for-princes’ theorists.197 For these would-be advisors to princes, their purpose 
was two-fold: to earn personal favor for themselves through aiding their respective ruler 
in achieving his political goals. More specifically, these writers sought to help their 
prince govern in a way that would result in winning for him glory, honor, and fame. As 
Alkis Kontos explains: “As success is directly related to results, so is glory to success. 
Glory is the natural consequence of success.”198  
For example, in his Book of the Courtier—one of “the most celebrated and 
influential” of the advice-books and “one of the most widely-read books of the sixteenth 
century”199—Baldesar Castiglione declares “the end of the perfect courtier” to be: “to win 
for himself the mind and favour of the prince he serves that he can…make his prince 
realize the honour and advantages that accrue to him and his family”, thus earning him 
“the same glory” and “worthy emulation” given to other outstanding men of the ancient 
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world.200 Similarly, in his The Prince, Giovani Pontano ends his advice to Alfonso II, 
duke of Calabria, by declaring his hope that: “in reading [which I have written] you will 
recognize yourself and those accomplishments of yours which win the highest praise, and 
you will inspire yourself on toward greater glory each day.”201  
If earning glory, honor, and fame were the supreme goal of political action, how 
were these achieved? These writers asserted this was done through action that promoted 
the common good and welfare of the state, or patria. According to Kontos:  
“The goal of political leadership is to establish an environment whereby the basic 
and immutable tenets of human nature are fully accommodated and utilized, and 
maintain and stabilize such accommodation as long as possible through the 
creation of appropriate socio-political institutions.”202 
Public good was prioritized over personal ambition; methods and institutions that 
promoted liberty were to be praised, those tending toward tyranny to be condemned.  
Like his humanist forerunners, Machiavelli upholds glory, honor, and fame as the 
ultimate goals of political action. And for Machiavelli, there were particular political 
actions that were able to earn a prince the highest share of this glory. As he writes in the 
‘Exhortation’: “nothing brings a man greater honour than the new laws and new 
institutions he establishes. When these are soundly based and bear the mark of greatness, 
they make him revered and admired.”203  
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The difference and originality of Machiavelli as it relates to the other advisor-for-
princes writers is not due, then, to a separate understanding of political purpose, but 
rather in regards to the particular pathway he advocates in reaching traditionally accepted 
goals. Such a contention is well-founded, and has been argued by various influential 
scholars across the years and ideological spectrum. As has been previously considered, 
Allan Gilbert and Quentin Skinner each hold similar positions regarding this overstated 
belief of Machiavelli’s originality. Each scholar respectively has argued that The Prince 
is not in fact an advice-book sui generis, but rather an accepted contribution to the genre 
that innovatively repurposed and reconstructed its conventions from the inside out.204  
For Skinner, Machiavelli’s innovation to the advice-for-princes genre came 
through the promulgation of a moral framework separate from that of the demands of 
traditional Christian virtue. This created a “different morality” for Machiavelli in 
comparison to his humanist contemporaries and predecessors: “two rival and 
incompatible accounts of what ought ultimately to be done.”205 Using a delineation 
framework built upon Berlin,206 Skinner argued this “essential contrast” between the 
traditional moral system of other humanists and that of Machiavelli to reside within their 
respective conceptions of virtù: where virtù for the former was almost wholly equated 
with the possession of all the major virtues as understood through contemporary 
Christianity, while for the latter, virtù could be applied to “whatever range of qualities” 
dictated by political necessity.207  
                                                
204 See in this connection, Gilbert, Machiavelli’s Prince and Its Forerunners, vi, 231-32; 
also Skinner, Foundations of Political Thought, 118, 135.  
205 Skinner, Foundations of Political Thought, 131, 134-35.  
206 See in this connection Berlin, Originality of Machiavelli, especially 183.  
207 Ibid., 138 (emphasis original). 
 65 
Similar to Skinner, what comprised the difference and originality of The Prince 
for Gilbert was its commitment to realism. Machiavelli’s “true originality” according to 
Gilbert: “may be summed up in his conviction that government is an independent art in 
an imperfect world; it is practical, and the only true theory is that derived from returning 
to practice.”208 Unlike the previous works of de regimine principum, Machiavelli spoke 
of new ideas and methods not based altogether in moral virtue, including those derived 
from actions and rulers which had hitherto been condemned as tyrannical. In doing this, 
Machiavelli created a “new moral principle” centered around his “theory of state,” 
predicated on an understanding that: “for the good life of man settled order was 
indispensable,” and thus “at all costs there must be firmly established government; there 
rests the morality of nations.”209 So likewise, Gilbert asserts that Machiavelli was no 
teacher of evil, in no small part due to the conventionality of his goals of politics and 
their purposeful adherence to upholding the common good of man. 
Further, it is important to understand that the within the humanist and Christian 
intellectual tradition, seeking such goals as worldly glory was not considered to be an 
immoral or irreligious pursuit. As Viroli explains:  
“Even the earthly glory that makes men immortal, while it may be a human 
creation, is not isolated from God…The concept of a man whose love of 
fatherland and glory makes him godlike, and who takes on a certain divine nature, 
is present in a venerable tradition of political and religious thought.”210 
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Petrarch, one of Machiavelli’s literary heroes, believed that a desire for glory was a 
natural facet of human nature. Viroli summarizes from Petrarch’s Prose: “Earthly glory is 
a goal that men can pursue with a view to eternal salvation, and there was no reason to 
renounce the former in exchange for the latter.”211 Other influential Italian humanists, 
including: Giovanni Conversano, Poggio Bracciolini, Flavio Biondo, Leon Battista 
Alberti, and Matteo Palmieri, among others, defended and promoted the prevailing notion 
that the classical notion of glory was not only acceptable, but favored by God.212  
 Machiavelli himself even included such associations between temporal exaltation 
and religious dependency in his writings. In his Discourse on Florentine Affairs After the 
Death of Lorenzo, a treatise he wrote for Giulio dé Medici,213 Machiavelli attributes the 
ability to achieve worldly glory and immortality to God (‘Heaven’):  
“Heaven cannot give a man a greater gift than this or point him a more glorious 
way. Amid all the happiness that God has given your house and your Holiness 
personally, this is the greatest: the gift of the power and the occasion to make 
yourself immortal and far outdo the fame of your father and your ancestors.”214 
This statement echoes what he had written earlier in The Prince when speaking of the 
opportunity for glory provided by the oppression of present-day Italy. As Machiavelli 
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declares in the ‘Exhortation’: “I believe that so many things conspire to favour a new 
prince, that I cannot imagine there ever was a time more suitable than the present.”215 He 
then proceeds to explicate further the nature of the opportunity for winning glory and 
honor, and in doing so, again intermixes the pursuit of worldly praise with a divine 
element: “See how Italy beseeches God to send someone to save her…your illustrious 
House, which, with its fortune and prowess, favoured by God and by the Church…can 
lead Italy to her salvation.”216 Finally, Machiavelli concludes this discussion of 
opportunity by yielding to God not only the ultimate determination on allocating glory, 
but also that He actually chooses to yield a portion of His glory to mankind as a reward 
for proper exercise of free will: “God does not want to…take away from us our free will 
and our share of the glory which belongs to us.”217 
It is clear, therefore, that in The Prince Machiavelli upholds the pursuit of glory, 
honor, and fame as the goals of politics, and that he sees lying within the situation of 
present-day Italy a rare opportunity to win the greatest possible portion of admiration and 
praise. He can imagine no circumstance more apposite, and declares that both God and 
fortune favor the new prince set on redemption. His declaration of divine favor and 
participation in granting glory for human actions also make expressly clear that 
Machiavelli understands the goals and rewards of politics to be permitted and sanctioned 
by God.   
Nature of Outcome  
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As has been seen, Machiavelli understood the nature of political action to be 
contingent on the interaction of various forces—the most important being man, fortune, 
and God. The outcome of human endeavors (more specifically, those involving political 
governance) was determined by not only human nature, but also the changeable nature of 
fortune and the divine nature of God that together shaped the nature of circumstance and 
opportunity. For its part, fortune could either act favorably or malevolently, while—
separately and according to His own divine plan—God chose to intervene to aid those He 
selected as friends, or remain uninvolved for some unknowable purpose.   
With the final chapter of The Prince, Machiavelli ultimately brings together his 
framework of nature to give practical purpose for the corpus of political advice provided 
in his treatise. It is in the ‘Exhortation’ that we find the nature of Machiavelli’s purpose. 
Beginning in the very first sentence, Machiavelli explains his goals of politics and his 
goal in writing The Prince:  
“After deliberating on all the things discussed above, I asked myself whether in 
present-day Italy the times were propitious to honour a new prince, and whether 
the circumstances existed here to introduce a new order, bringing honour to 
himself and prosperity to all the Italians. Well, I believe that so many things 
conspire to favour a new prince, that I cannot imagine there ever was a time more 
suitable than the present.”218 
No time is more suitable for action. Though fortune can act capriciously and maliciously 
against a new prince, in the present day it has created the greatest opportunity for divine 
friendship and aid. Further, Machiavelli goes on to assure his reader that the political 
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endeavor at hand is both just and achievable. All that remains is for someone to exercise 
their divinely-ordained free will, raise the banner, and take action. And in doing so, the 
new prince will not only liberate Italy from tyranny, but he will earn for himself the 
utmost honor and glory. 
Having asserted this framework with an inspiration and emotion quite 
uncharacteristic of the previous twenty-five chapters, Machiavelli then proffers several 
qualifying statements on why others have failed to achieve the political outcome he 
essentially promises to his Medici audience. Doubtless, these qualifications are intended 
as final assurance to his reader—seeking both to quell any remaining apprehensions 
about the plausibility of the task at hand, and to further fortify his claims regarding the 
efficacy and exceptionality of his prescriptions. However, these qualifying statements, 
wherein Machiavelli briefly diagnoses the failures of those who had came before, also 
provide critical insight into how Machiavelli’s understanding of nature—i.e. human 
nature, the nature of God, and the nature of fortune—underpins the foundation of his 
political philosophy.  
Machiavelli sees the nature of outcome of a particular human endeavor—that is, a 
successful outcome or a failed outcome—as contingent upon the relationship between 
each of these disparate but interacting natures. Some times the respective natures of 
humans, God, and fortune are all in alignment; other times they are in conflict. Most of 
the time, the nature of outcome depends on only the interplay between humans and 
fortune—as, we have seen, a central element to the nature of Machiavelli’s God is 
allowing His creations to function independently of Him through the exercise of their free 
will. Therefore, through his assurances and admonitions in the concluding chapter of The 
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Prince, Machiavelli, with complete intellectual honesty and unmistakable urgency, 
passion, and sincerity, presents his understanding of the nature of outcomes—of which, 
the only assured positive political outcome for Italy involves the assistance and blessing 
of God.  
He begins with a practical diagnosis of failure. “It is not to be marveled at,” 
Machiavelli declares, “that none of the Italians I have named has succeeded in doing 
what, it is hoped, your illustrious House will do, or that in so many revolutions in Italy 
and so many martial campaigns it has always seemed that our military prowess has been 
distinguished.”219 For this charge, he indicts two things: inept military systems and 
inadequate leaders.  
Firstly, Machiavelli prosecutes contemporary military systems for why no one 
had yet accomplished this Italian salvation he claims ‘will not be very hard.’ He 
immediately explains: “this is because the old military systems were bad and there has 
been no one who knew how to establish one.”220 The Italian military, he asserts, requires 
a “thorough reorganization,” as “we would find greater prowess among those who follow, 
were it not lacking among the leaders.”221 It is not that Italian stock is incapable of 
military prowess, he is careful to clarify, in fact quite the opposite. Ever the nationalist, 
Machiavelli is quick to defend the virtue of the Italian individual: “Look at the duels and 
the combats between a few, how the Italians are superior in strength, in skill, in 
inventiveness”; only “when it is a matter of armies, they do not compare.”222  
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This second fault he levies at individual leaders: “All this is because of the 
weakness of the leaders.”223 Disobedience pervades armies, he states, even: “those who 
are capable are not obeyed.” Rather than lay blame for this on the ‘superior’ Italian 
soldiers, however, Machiavelli explains it is because: “hitherto no one has had the 
competence to dominate the others by his prowess and good fortune,” and, “as a result of 
this, over so long a time, in so many wars during the past twenty years, when there has 
been an all-Italian army it has always given a bad account of itself”.224 So in addition to 
poor military organization, the reason no Italian has yet succeeded in doing what 
Machiavelli hopes will be done by the Medici is due to incompetent, weak leaders who 
lack great prowess, good fortune, and the inventiveness to establish new systems.  
This sets the foundation for the ultimate qualification Machiavelli provides to 
explain why ‘none of the Italians [he had] named’ had yet led Italy to her salvation: that 
they had not emulated the methods of those Machiavelli had singled out for admiration, 
and had not heeded Machiavelli’s political advice. Throughout the ‘Exhortation’, 
Machiavelli correlates the ease, not to mention the success, of Italian restoration with 
adherence to his explication on how to imitate Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus: “The task will 
not be very hard, if you will call to mind the actions and lives of the men I have 
mentioned”; “There is the greatest readiness, and where that is so there cannot be great 
difficulty, provided only your House will emulated the methods of those I have singled 
out for admiration”; “Therefore if your illustrious House wants to emulate those eminent 
men who saved their countries”.225  
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On one hand, this qualification is again practical—it deals with the temporal, 
pragmatic application of methodology Machiavelli considers to be more politically 
advantageous than that used latterly by other men and would-be princes. In short, 
Machiavelli posits that the imitation of the actions and institutions utilized by Moses et 
al. lends a more favorable political outcome for Italy and a new prince than yet had arisen 
deviating from their examples. Others have failed to restore their states because in either 
their actions, institutions, or dealings with fortune their methods were found wanting.  
This qualification is also obviously self-aggrandizing: Machiavelli contrasts the 
failures of others who came before with the triumphs of great men, in whose name he 
provides his own prognosis and enunciation of the particular methods they used to 
achieve their positive outcome—essentially appropriating their successes for himself, and 
in doing so purposefully demonstrating his discerning erudition and concomitant value as 
an apposite political advisor. Machiavelli himself even acknowledges the ambitious 
element supplementing his authorial intent in the dedicatory letter preceding The Prince: 
“And if, from your lofty peak, Your Magnificence will sometimes glance down to these 
low-lying regions, you will realize the extent to which, undeservedly, I have to endure the 
great and unremitting malice of fortune.”226 Furthermore, this qualification also serves 
the practical purpose of rhetorically protecting the credibility of its author. In the case 
that his supplied prescriptions and assumptions were proven fruitless, Machiavelli could 
retain sufficient recourse to assert his advice was not followed irrevocably, or perhaps it 
was only followed pusillanimously, and remain shielded from excessive censure.  
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On the other hand, however, in a much subtler way this qualification—that all 
required for Italian redemption through the present opportunity is emulation of these 
three eminent men and their methods—is also providential. It is providential in that it 
deals with the spiritual, incorporeal intervention of God into the worldly equation, tipping 
the scales of outcome in favor of His friends. As we have seen, Machiavelli’s God gives 
friendship to a select few who act with virtù in their presented opportunities, and 
intervenes to aid His friends in order for their task of restoration to be achievable. Quite 
telling, then, are the men Machiavelli ‘singles out’ in the ‘Exhortation’ as friends of 
God—first Moses, then Cyrus, and finally Theseus.227 Absent from this ultimate list were 
other men Machiavelli had also previously cited as practical, political archetypes to be 
imitated, such as: Romulus, whom he includes in addition to this recommended troika 
when originally introducing them in Ch. VI; Hiero of Syracuse, whom in the same 
chapter he cites as a lesser example, but still one to be emulated by others of its kind; and 
Cesare Borgia, of whom he states: “I know no better precepts to give a new prince than 
ones derived from Cesare’s actions.”228  
The omission of Romulus, Hiero, Cesare, and anyone else previously praised 
within The Prince from the triad Machiavelli repeatedly charges his reader to imitate in 
the ‘Exhortation’, then, denotes the presence of a special status conferred by Machiavelli 
on those possessing the friendship of God. True friends of God will not fail in their task 
of redeeming their country, as did the unspecified man Machiavelli refers to earlier in the 
‘Exhortation’: “And although before now there was a man in whom some spark seemed 
to show that he was ordained by God to redeem the country, none the less it was seen 
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afterwards, at the very height of his career, he was rejected by fortune.”229 Though some 
allow for the possibility of reference to other recent Italian leaders, such as Pope Julius II, 
the vast majority of scholars maintain that the unspecified man in question was most 
likely Cesare Borgia.230 In my opinion, this widely-held assumption that here Machiavelli 
was referring to Cesare Borgia appears by and far the most logical choice, supported by 
both historical context and the of language of the text.231 Therefore, once we [safely] 
assume Cesare as the intended target of this remark, then this too serves to further 
reinforce Machiavelli’s implication that only friendship with God truly ensures ultimate 
success for those attempting to save their country. Moreover, it strengthens the overall 
interpretation that in his political theory, Machiavelli placed considerable emphasis on 
the role and power of God. 
 For, operating under this assumption of Cesare Borgia, we see Machiavelli 
deliberately juxtapose the nature of outcome of the practical with the providential: the 
triumph of fortune over those independent from divine grace versus the glorious outcome 
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given and promised to the friends of God. His reader would recall earlier, in Chapter VII, 
where Machiavelli had considered Cesare at some length and praised him highly for his 
practical political ability:  
“Cesare Borgia, commonly called duke Valentino, acquired his state through the 
good fortune of his father, and lost it when that disappeared; and this happened 
even though he used the same ways and means any prudent and capable prince 
would to consolidate his power in the states he had won by the arms and fortune 
of others…So if we consider the duke’s career as a whole, we find that he laid 
strong foundations for the future. And I do not consider it superfluous to discuss 
these, because I know no better precepts to give a new prince than ones derived 
from Cesare’s actions; and if what he instituted was of no avail, this was not his 
fault but arose from the extraordinary and inordinate malice of fortune.”232 
However, ‘at the very height of his career,’ Machiavelli tells us, even Cesare (putatively 
considered by many the “hero of The Prince” and Machiavelli’s “ideal monarch”233), his 
prime example of practical princely virtue and the representative manifestation of the 
zenith of independent human ability, ultimately failed to redeem Italy. In The Prince 
Machiavelli tells that Cesare’s downfall came at the hand of fortune—both through its 
‘extraordinary and inordinate malice’ and its ‘rejection’—explaining: “his plans were 
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frustrated only because Alexander’s life234 was cut short and because of his own 
sickness.”235 Machiavelli eventually goes on to acknowledge a single error made by 
Cesare: “The duke deserves censure only regarding the election of Pope Julius [II], where 
he made a bad choice.”236  
Elsewhere, though, Machiavelli supplies additional context for Cesare’s failure. 
Machiavelli’s dispatches to the Signoria from late 1503, written on a diplomatic mission 
to the papal court in Rome while his post in the Florentine chancery, contain more 
detailed accounts of Cesare’s shortcomings, particularly related to the deficiencies of his 
natural character: “The Duke meantime allows himself to be carried away by his 
sanguine confidence, believing that the word of others is more to be relied upon than his 
own”237; “have perceived a change in [the Duke, who] seems…irresolute, suspicious, and 
unstable in all his conclusions. This may be the result of his natural character, or because 
the blows of fortune, which he is not accustomed to bear, have stunned and confounded 
him”238; “the Duke seemed to him to have lost his wits, for he appeared not to know 
himself what he wanted, and that he was confused and irresolute.”239  
Machiavelli here depicts the maxim he later encapsulates in The Prince. When the 
well of good fortune Cesare had inherited from his father eventually ran dry, the defects 
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endemic to his human nature quickly undid him. The Duke’s nature, characterized by a 
‘sanguine confidence,’ which before had helped him act impetuously, metastasized into 
obstinate arrogance in the vicissitudes of fortune and clouded his judgment irreparably. 
This resulted in him overplaying his hand by mistaking the strength and nature of his 
enemies, leading him to vacillate rather than act to secure his position, and eventually 
rendered him mercurial and ineffective. As such, he was then easily bested by ill-fortune 
and his mountain of enemies.  
In short, the full picture of Cesare given through Machiavelli’s dispatches echoes 
the latter’s precepts in Chapter XXV of The Prince regarding the constraints of individual 
nature in dealing with the circumstances of fortune. “I…believe that the one who adapts 
his policy to the times prospers, and likewise that the one whose policy clashes with the 
demands of the times does not,” Machiavelli opines frankly, “Nor do we find any man 
shrewd enough to know how to adapt his policy in this way; either because he cannot do 
otherwise than what is in character or because, having always prospered by proceeding 
one way, he cannot persuade himself to change.”240 Machiavelli ends this discussion with 
perhaps one of his most paradoxical and thoroughly debated propositions: “I conclude, 
therefore, that as fortune is changeable whereas men are obstinate in their ways, men 
prosper so long as fortune and policy are in accord, and when there is a clash they 
fail.”241 This sentiment is reiterated by Machiavelli again in the Discourses:  
“Two things are causes why we are unable to change: one, that we are unable to 
oppose that to which nature inclines us; the other, that when on individual has 
prospered very much with one mode of proceeding, it is not possible to persuade 
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him that he can do well to proceed otherwise. Hence it arises that fortune varies in 
one man, because it varies the times and he does not vary the modes.”242 
As Cary J. Nederman has suggested, that, for Machiavelli: “nature and character 
combine  
to render people incapable of responding to new conditions and changes of fortune. 
Regardless of circumstance, individuals can be expected to follow a consistent path in 
their actions.”243 “If they are lucky,” he continues, “their nature and character will suit the 
times, and they will succeed; otherwise, their failure is assured.”244 Though Nederman 
does go on to qualify this assertion that ‘their failure is assured’—acknowledging that 
Machiavelli, at times, “appears to intimate that fortune…may be overcome by rulers” 
through developing a nature of “practical” “flexibility”245—resigning those not favored 
by fortune to ‘assured failure’ is undoubtedly an overstatement of Machiavelli’s position. 
After all, as seen above, Machiavelli begins this discussion of fortune by reproving the 
regnant belief that men have no influence over events, instead supplying as a correction 
his view that fortune is the arbiter of only half the things we do, leaving the remaining 
partial to be controlled by us.246 And, as Nederman points out, Machiavelli goes on to 
advance that if a man is flexible enough to vary his methods according to the 
circumstance, and prudent enough to recognize the transience of his circumstances, the 
prosperity of his fortunes “would not change.”247 This leads to Machiavelli’s infamous 
conclusion: “that it is better to be impetuous than circumspect; because fortune is a 
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woman and if she is to be submissive it is necessary to beat and coerce her,” and that 
“being a woman, she favours young men, because they are less circumspect and more 
ardent and because they command her with greater audacity”248 The very fact that 
Machiavelli holds certain conditions as the most favorable to command fortune, and 
advises requisite precepts he contends most useful to maintaining a positive state of 
fortune denotes that he believes, at least hypothetically, that men through their nature and 
action can overcome fortune.  
However, Nederman’s argument regarding what Machiavelli sees as the 
likelihood that an individual can, in fact, actively and flexibly regulate and amend their 
characteristic nature is, in my opinion, insightful and well-substantiated. Nederman 
posits: 
“Machiavelli’s evaluation of the chances for creating a new, psychologically 
flexible type  
of character is extremely guarded. He tends to word his advocacy of it in 
conditional  
form and in the subjunctive mood: ‘If it were possible to change one’s nature to 
suit the  
times and circumstances, one would always be successful.’”249 
While Machiavelli, perhaps (ironically) even despite himself, seems to retain 
some possibility that such a thing can be accomplished by human nature and thus fortune 
can be repeatedly defeated, the outlook he presents is bleak. Despite the ample 
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consideration given to the topic of fortune in The Prince, nowhere does Machiavelli 
explicitly affirm a personal belief that unaided, autonomous human nature can overcome 
the purview of fortune indefinitely.  
Scholars point to this so-called “Machiavellian Predicament” as further evidence 
of Machiavelli’s true pessimism and condemnation of human nature.250 After all, if 
Cesare Borgia—understood to be the most highly exalted of Machiavelli’s new princes—
was ultimately rejected by fortune, then it is only logical to conclude that in effect 
Machiavelli must truly regard the supposition as futile. An exemplary iteration of this 
common scholarly interpretation can be found in Robert Black’s discussion on the 
message and meaning of The Prince.251 At this time, I believe it both appropriate and 
necessary to briefly explore Black’s consideration of this ambiguous Machiavellian topos 
in order to more sufficiently contextualize the issue at hand.  
According to Black, Machiavelli understood the political world to be: 
“susceptible to irrational forces that could frustrate even the most ‘virtuous’ 
individuals.”252 Of these, fortune was the most important: “regarded by Machiavelli and 
his contemporaries as an unpredictable and chaotic agent capable of wreaking havoc on 
the most carefully planned an executed human endeavors.” Black cites Cesare Borgia as: 
“the supreme example of fortune’s malign power in The Prince.” While “Machiavelli did 
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not accept that fortune was omnipotent in human affairs,” Black contends, “his analysis 
in The Prince of how fortune can be overcome is far from straightforward.” As Black 
sees it: “The difficulty with Machiavelli’s exposition is that he puts forward one 
argument, only to contradict in the next what he has just asserted.” Black then proceeds 
to trace the lines of argumentation Machiavelli proposes in Chapter XXV—what he 
considers “amounts to a dialogue” Machiavelli has with himself, wherein “one hypothesis 
is suggested, only to be overturned by the next argument.”:  
“First, Machiavelli compares fortune to an overflowing river that needs to be 
opposed”; “Then, however, he returns to the theory of harmony with the times”; 
But, “individuals cannot change their own character, and so the implication is that 
the earlier argument…is invalid”; “Then Machiavelli launches into a third 
argument: fortune is a woman”; Meaning “he again undermines his previous 
argument: regardless of the prevailing circumstances, it is normally best to be 
impetuous”; “However, in the next chapter he soon refutes even this argument. By 
pointing to Cesare Borgia…he gives a prime example of how daring and 
manliness can be of no avail in the face of fortune.”253 
Black concludes: “In the end, however, Machiavelli does wind up the process of self-
contradiction, although the final solution is articulated obliquely. The key factor turns out 
to be timeliness or the right occasion: a prince can succeed in his endeavors if he finds 
the proper moment.” Or, more generally, Black sees Machiavelli’s “answer to the puzzle 
about fortune posed in The Prince” to be nothing more than: “a variation of another time-
honoured proverb: carpe diem.” 
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 As has been seen, Black’s interpretation of Machiavelli is viewed through an 
ardently irreligious lens: God to Machiavelli was impotent and indifferent to human 
affairs, if He even existed at all.254 Through this God-less framework, Black is forced to 
conclude his analysis with the entirely unsatisfying ‘oblique final solution’ that 
Machiavelli himself conceded that the successful articulation of his political philosophy 
rested entirely on a cliché. Though he includes includes the fact that “the visionary, 
messianic note of Chapter XXVI has confounded readers,” Black proffers no explanation 
attempting to solve this dubiety, and admits the chapter does not seem “internally 
consistent”.255 Perhaps because of this, Black never considers the ‘Exhortation’ at length, 
and his analysis ultimately omits any discussion or explanation of Machiavelli’s 
invocation of the friendship of God.  
 However, when Black’s self-imposed interpretive restriction against divine 
consideration is removed, Machiavelli’s conclusion in the ‘Exhortation’ becomes much 
clearer. Not only does Machiavelli declare the opportunity ripe for the taking, he also 
injects the friendship of God into the calculus. Imitation of Moses, Cyrus and Theseus, 
men ‘singled out for admiration,’ men Machiavelli understood to be ‘friends of God,’ and 
not Cesare Borgia, who acted against fortune without divine assistance is the way to 
assured success. This interpretation is corroborated by the Discourses, where Machiavelli 
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supplies: “If how human affairs proceed is considered well, it will be seen that often 
things arise and accidents come about that the [Heavens] have not altogether wished to be 
provided against.”256 When the ‘Heavens,’ or, rather, God, stands by and does not get 
involved in human affairs, the best that man can hope for is to work alongside fortune, 
not overcome her completely. He concludes: “I indeed affirm it anew to be very true, 
according to what is seen through all the histories, that men can second fortune but not 
oppose it, that they can weave its warp but not break it.”257  
Only when God is injected into human affairs can man be sure of defeating 
fortune. It is only for the ‘friends of God,’ Machiavelli boasts, that “unheard-of wonders 
are to be seen, performed by God,” and conspire to their greatness.258 God’s friendship is 
given to a select few who act according to certain methods within their presented 
opportunities, and He intervenes to aid His friends in order for their task of restoration to 
be achievable.  
In the ‘Exhortation’, then, Machiavelli seems to be guaranteeing a positive 
outcome in the endeavor of Italian redemption contingent upon the new prince’s status as 
a friend of God, and achieving the highest level of glory and honor that accompanies 
ordering new laws and institutions. Just as with Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus, divine 
intervention will counter the limitations of nature and fortune and provide for 
unequivocal success. Despite this, various scholars have denied Machiavelli’s belief in 
divine intervention by pointing to the fact that, unlike Moses, Cyrus and Theseus were 
secular rulers. Graham Hammill contends that by linking Moses to non-theocratic rulers, 
                                                
256 Discourses, II, 29 (Mansfield and Tarcov, Discourses, 197). In Gilbert’s translation, 
“Heavens” is capitalized and made formal. See in this connection Gilbert, Works, I, 406.  
257 Ibid., II, 30 (Mansfield and Tarcov, Discourses, 199). 
258 The Prince, 26 (Bull, The Prince, 83).  
 84 
Machiavelli in effect actually: “underscores the fictional nature of Moses’s claims.”259 
According to Hammill: 
“[Machiavelli] stages and performs deference to divine intervention in order to 
underscore the way in which claims to revelation secure political authority 
through belief in them…Machiavelli presents Moses as an exemplary instance of 
political calculation. It ends up that Moses is not that different from Cyrus and 
other pagan rulers who founded their governance based on their own powers, ‘if 
their particular actions and methods are examined’…All founders and reformers, 
Moses included, use the fiction of revelation to further their political ends.”260  
Hammill supplements this analysis by referencing Victoria Kahn, who had previously 
argued that the rhetoric utilized by Machiavelli underlined his true opinion.261 Kahn 
insisted:  
“Renaissance readers of this chapter were particularly disturbed by the inclusion 
of Moses among those who became princes ‘by their own virtù.” They could not 
help noticing Machiavelli’s ironic deference to Moses’s ‘teacher’ and his sly 
imputation that Moses had feigned divine favor…In these remarks Machiavelli 
conflates the language of divine providence with that of princely virtù, and so 
negates the distinction between Moses and Cyrus even as he insists on it.”262  
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Thus, Hammill concludes: “Machiavelli demonstrates the political force of the fiction of 
revelation at the very moment that he wryly denies its status as fiction.”263  
 Yet several issues arise with this line of argumentation; not the least of which is 
the blinding, preconceived bias required to derive an implicitly ‘ironic,’ tongue-in-cheek 
underlying rhetorical motive. If one considers the same passages with an opposite 
religious interpretation to those of Hammill and Kahn (as I admit to holding), then they 
just as easily lend themselves to a clearly orthodox reading. In fact, it follows that the 
reverse of Hammill and Kahn’s assumption is far more plausible. For, just as 
Machiavelli’s linking of Moses to the secular rulers could conceivably undermine his 
religious authenticity, so too could this connection cogently strengthen Machiavelli’s 
ability to reason about his political activity.  
As John H. Geerken explains:  
“Had Machiavelli not thus qualified Moses’ presence in The Prince, his readers 
might have themselves dismissed Moses, arguing that he was too special, heroic, 
and unusual to warrant inclusion in a discussion aimed at imitative political 
behavior. By anticipating such an objection and articulating it, Machiavelli 
neutralized it.”264  
Following a well-worn rhetorical pathway utilized by both Cicero and Aristotle, Geerken 
clarifies: “Machiavelli resorted to such standard forensic tactics as beginning to say 
something, but stopping short; of citing, but not amplifying, thereby bringing the reader 
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to greater receptivity.”265 Therefore, Machiavelli: “was manipulating basically secular 
and potentially skeptical readers into more willing acceptance of a religious dimension by 
inserting it and then immediately withdrawing it.”266  
Additionally, as Black repeatedly notes, Machiavelli did not write The Prince for 
publication or wide-circulation: “The Prince and the Discourses were written in a casual, 
conversational, even ungrammatical and rough manner—suitable for what amounted o 
conversation or communication with friends.”267 In these works, Machiavelli: “wrote as a 
rejected and angry outcast”268; his opinions and positions are presented “with stupefying 
candor.”269 For example, despite addressing the end of Chapter XI to Pope Leo X: 
“Machiavelli does not altogether conceal his anticlerical and antichristian sentiments. The 
derogatory tone of his remarks about ecclesiastical principalities cannot be missed.”270 
Perhaps most notoriously, Machiavelli in Chapter XVIII explicitly advocates the 
necessity for a new prince to: “act in defiance of good faith, of charity, of kindness, of 
religion” and thus only need “appear a man of compassion, a man of good faith, a man of 
integrity, a kind and religious man.”271 All this to emphasize, Machiavelli had no qualms 
against opposing prevailing political, moral, or religious sentiment. His opinions are 
clear, often repeated, and personal, while his sarcasm, censure, and references are, on the 
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whole, obvious and apparent. Therefore, there was not only no need to ‘stage and 
perform’ ‘wryly ironic’ rhetorical facades, to do so would have been inconsistent with the 
tone of his treatise.   
 The most substantive error of these contentions of Hammill and Kahn, however, 
relates to historical context. Omitted from these interpretations is any consideration of the 
longstanding religious intellectual tradition upholding the idea that God is willing to 
intervene on behalf of secular as well as theocratic rulers. Such a belief, described by 
Nederman as a “hallmark of Christian thought,” had an intellectual tradition dating back 
much farther than Machiavelli’s ‘Exhortation’.272 As Nederman asserts: “the worthiness 
of the greatest pagan rulers in the eyes of God was upheld by medieval thinkers.”273 
Viroli, too, similarly explains: “In exceptional cases, the Christian God is willing to admit 
into the ranks of the blessed souls even rulers of pagan states.”274  
 Both scholars reference the legend of the Roman Emperor Trajan, popular in the 
Middle Ages, and narrated by Machiavelli himself in his Allocution to a Magistrate. 
According to Machiavelli’s iteration: “Though a pagan and an infidel, [Trajan] was 
received into the number of the elect, through the intercession of St. Gregory, for no other 
merit than he administered Justice without any special regard for anyone.”275 Following 
this, Machiavelli quotes from Dante’s Purgatorio,276 and concludes: “From this we can 
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see how much God loves Justice and mercy.”277 Similarly, the Thomist scholastic 
protégé, Ptolemy of Lucca, connected the political success of another pagan ruler, Cyrus, 
to divine intervention of the Christian God.278 As he wrote in his continuation of 
Aquinas’s unfinished work, The Rule of Princes:  
“With regard to those [pagans] exercising lordship, God seems to have granted 
the legitimacy of lordship…God makes a disposition on behalf of the subjects to 
bring about a better result when a ruler, although a sinner, strives to please God. 
…God disposed things in this way because Cyrus showed humility towards His 
faithful Jews…As a result of these good and virtuous works in favor of the divine 
cult and the people of God, he obtained the monarchy of the entire East.”279 
In this connection, Ptolemy quotes the Prophet Isaiah, who says of Cyrus:  
“Thus saith the LORD to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right had I have holden, to 
subdue nations before him; and I will loose the loins of kings, to open before him 
the two leaved gates; and the gates shall not be shut; I will go before thee, and 
make the crooked places straight: I will break in pieces the gates of brass, and cut 
in sunder the bars of iron: And I will give thee the treasures of darkness, and 
hidden riches of secret places, that thou mayest know that I, the LORD, which 
call thee by thy name, am the God of Israel.”280 
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In this passage it is scripturally clear that not only does God grant favor to the secular, 
pagan ruler Cyrus, He also promises to divinely intervene to aid His ‘anointed’ friend in 
his political endeavor, and to give him earthly, material rewards of glory and riches. It is 
therefore as Nederman asserts: “Not only does Machiavelli develop an internally 
consistent position with regard to the divine design regarding earthly political affairs, but 
he does so in a manner that perpetuates medieval Christian doctrines.”281  
Additionally, Machiavelli’s Florentine audience was fully attuned to the pervasive 
intermingling of religion and politics in their contemporary Renaissance milieu. Within 
this intermixed political-religious tradition, biblical sources held a vaulted status equal to 
that of secular, pagan, or ancient political writers. In tracing the context of official, 
political documents of the Florentine Republic, Gilbert explained: “There were two 
sources from which authoritative statements were drawn: classical literature and Christian 
writings. They carried equal weight.”282 Gilbert goes on to assert: “the Florentines did not 
assign to politics a separate sphere of their own, that they had no distinct criteria for 
politics.”283 Thus: “the Florentines were not inclined to take an exclusively religious or an 
exclusively mundane attitude.”284 Leaning on the work of Gilbert, Geerken likewise 
writes: “Florentines had for centuries been intermixing religion and politics, believing, 
for example…that [God] cared about their worldly affairs. They were, therefore, quite at 
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ease in including God in their calculations of political, economic, and pragmatic 
interest.”285  
Like Machiavelli, this Florentine belief rested upon an awareness that: “there 
were limits to what a rational approach in politics could achieve.”286 Therefore, while the 
Florentines “might deliberate according to human reason,” there remained a deeply 
religious conviction that political events were directly influenced by God’s will.287 
Indeed, even in the “deliberations of men who prided themselves on having the most 
subtle minds of Italy,” (here Machiavelli surely comes to mind), there often appears “an 
unrealistic, illusionary spirit,”; wherein “in their inner hearts, [they] would never believe 
that their situation could be hopeless” because repeatedly: “God had given signs that he 
had taken the city on the Arno under his special protection.”288  
 A contextual understanding of the Florentine political-religious tradition further 
enforces this interpretation that God played an essential role in Machiavelli’s political 
calculus, and thus that Judeo-Christian religion and theology comprise an inseparable 
element in his political philosophy. When viewed within this framework, it is clear that 
Machiavelli’s comparison and parallel analysis of scriptural figures (such as Moses) to 
pagan or secular figures (such as Cyrus and Theseus) would not have undermined the 
authority of either, but instead covered both facets of his contemporary political sphere. 
Rather than seem confusing or satirical, the ‘Exhortation’, with its ‘visionary, messianic 
tone’ and uncharacteristically ‘idealistic’ message, falls squarely into an accepted 
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tradition that the only assured path to worldly political success relies upon divine 




The Nature of Friendship 
 
The goal of politics and the purpose of his treatise are only arrived at for 
Machiavelli through a continuation and emphatic declaration of orthodox belief 
concerning the relationship between politics and religion: only through divine friendship 
can a prince be assured to overcome fortune and achieve the greatest glory, honor, and 
praise. Therefore, The Prince assuredly cannot mark a separation between politics and 
religion as is so often claimed.  
Beyond solving to the so-called “Machiavellian Predicament,” the nature of 
divine friendship also serves to justify Machiavelli’s putative separation between the 
traditional moral system of Christian virtues and the maxims of political necessity he so 
notoriously promoted in The Prince. As we have seen, the true the difference and 
originality of Machiavelli’s treatise was not in a redirection of political goals or purpose, 
but rather a revision of the accepted routes leading to the conventional terminus of glory 
et al. This contention was upheld by both Skinner and Gilbert, who each pointed to moral 
separation from Christianity to be the defining trait of Machiavelli’s new theory of state, 
in their respective ways. Though Skinner flatly refutes Strauss’s influential insistence that 
Machiavelli can only be characterized as a “teacher of evil,” no remaining consideration 
of the role of Christian religious morality and theology within Machiavelli’s political 
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philosophy is taken; thus resigning religion to the dictates of political expediency.289 For 
his part, Gilbert, although repeatedly emphasizing that “Machiavelli’s first interest was 
the good of the people of Italy,” and that The Prince “is not addressed to a tyrant but to a 
good ruler,” leaves the presence and question of Christian religion largely untouched in 
his history of de regimine principum.290 So while he too asserted that Machiavelli was no 
teacher of evil, Gilbert likewise removes any true emphasis of Christian theology from 
Machiavelli’s work.  
However, when the ‘Exhortation’ is considered with the appropriate theological 
emphasis, a new moral principle [to borrow Gilbert’s appellation] emerges. As we have 
seen, Machiavelli makes explicitly clear that it is in God’s nature to aid those He selects 
as friends in their political endeavors through divine-intervention. What Machiavelli 
makes less clear, however, is his corresponding belief that it is also characteristic of 
God’s nature to forgive His friends and those who act in pursuit of the greater good 
when, through necessity, they are unable to succeed without the exercise of sin. Just as 
divine forgiveness allows for the salvation of human souls through grace despite their 
sins, so too Machiavelli conceives this doctrine applying to the sphere of political action.  
Divine forgiveness (which can be alternately understood as falling underneath the 
concept of grace), alleviates the inherent conflict arising from political action in a fallen 
world. God does not call on man to do the impossible, yet ‘all have sinned, and come 
short of the glory of God.’ Without divine forgiveness, Christianity would lack internal-
logic. Viroli understood such a conception of forgiveness to the be bridge between God 
and the world, resulting in Machiavelli’s answer to Guicciardini’s claim of irreconcilable 
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incompatibility: “There is consequently no need to choose between God and the 
world…since God himself wants us to work in the world in order to achieve his plans, 
even at the cost of committing evil.”291 
As we have seen, Machiavelli understood opportunities for achieving true glory to 
involve a divine element. Further, these opportunities were both just and achievable. And 
finally, action was required in order to earn the share of glory God reserves for His 
friends who exercise their free will. In the ‘Exhortation’ Machiavelli assures that all of 
these elements are in place for a new prince who would redeem Italy from her present 
oppression. “The task will not be very hard,” he writes, “if you will call to mind the 
actions and lives of the men I have mentioned.”292 
Among these actions, Machiavelli had notoriously included: the judicious use of cruelty; 
the practice of parsimony up to the precipice of being a miser; choosing to be feared over 
loved; breaking your word when it suits you; the desire to appear virtuous rather depend 
on obtaining true virtue, particularly as it relates to appearing religious; and similarly, to 
don the cloak of religion in order to appropriate faith for pious cruelty.293  
Tellingly, Machiavelli does not assert or posture even the most tepid of these 
deceptive or self-seeking precepts to be considered as truly virtuous. On the contrary, 
most of these maxims are first introduced with a concession that if one is able to act 
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virtuously, then that is the praiseworthy path. These actions and methods are only 
presented as having been proven to be politically effective through Machiavelli’s study of 
history. And many of them, such as the use of cruelty, come with explicit instructions 
regarding the nature in which they are acceptable. He considers the use of cruelty in 
Chapter VIII, positing:  
“I believe that here it is a question of cruelty used well or badly. We can say that 
cruelty is used well (if it is permissible to talk in this way of what is evil) when it 
is employed once and for all, and one’s safety depends on it, and then it is not 
persisted in but as far as possible turned to the good of one’s subjects. Cruelty 
badly used is that which, although infrequent to start with, as time goes on, rather 
than, disappearing, grows in intensity.”294 
First, Machiavelli concedes that cruelty is ‘evil,’ and not something to be praised. That 
said, it remains something that can ultimately be used to promote the greater ‘good of 
one’s subjects.’ So it seems that with cruelty, the end justifies the means. However, 
Machiavelli goes on to further qualify the means of cruelty—it is good only when one’s 
safety is directly contingent upon its use, and it continues only as long as it can aid the 
good of the subjects. Here, it is important to emphasize the good of the subjects. Thus, 
Machiavelli allows the prince to resort to cruelty only in matters of extreme personal 
safety, as the perseverance of the head of state ensures the continuing stability of the state 
for those below. The ruler is not, however, allowed to use cruelty for his own personal 
good (except for the obvious concession that it is good for the ruler to preserve his own 
life)—meaning it is only to be used in dire need of preservation, not as a mechanism of 
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self-interest or political ambition. Additionally, while there are certain specific instances 
where cruelty can be ‘used well,’ it can still continue to be used badly. Excluding 
ensuring direct safety, the remainder of cruelty cannot be classified as a necessary evil.  
 Therefore, we find that the maxim most associated with Machiavelli is not, in 
fact, even truly Machiavellian. As we see here, the end justifies the means—until it 
doesn’t. Machiavelli explains that his political experience has shown that a very narrow 
appropriation of an evil (cruelty), restricted in both intent and frequency, can ultimately 
prove a justifiable means. He concludes: “Those who use the first method can, with God 
and men, somewhat enhance their position, as did Agathocles.”295 Anything else, 
however, is disqualifying. Those who use cruelty badly: “cannot possibly stay in 
power.”296 
When considering Machiavelli’s full discussion of Agathocles, the necessity for 
revision of his popularly attributed cliché becomes even more clear. Earlier in the 
chapter, he concludes his consideration of the the Sicilian turned king of Syracuse by 
acknowledging Agathocles’ independency from fortune:  
“So whoever studies that man’s actions and life will discover little or nothing that 
can be attributed to fortune… his progress was attended by countless difficulties 
and dangers; that was how he won his principality, and he maintained his position 
with many audacious and dangerous enterprises.”297  
As we have seen, Machiavelli previously considered Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, and 
Theseus in almost the exact language. These men were praised as “the most outstanding” 
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examples of those who came to power by their own abilities and not from reliance upon 
fortune: “And when we come to examine their actions and lives, they do not seem to have 
had from fortune anything other than opportunity.”298 
Following this acknowledgment of personal ability, however, Machiavelli 
immediately alters the tenor of his discussion on Agathocles. He qualifies:  
“Yet it cannot be called prowess to kill fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be 
treacherous, pitiless, irreligious. These ways can win a prince power but not glory. 
One can draw attention to the prowess of Agathocles in confronting and surviving 
danger, and his courageous spirit in enduring and overcoming adversity, and it 
appears that he should not be judged inferior to any eminent commander; none the 
less, his brutal cruelty and inhumanity, his countless crimes, forbid his being 
honoured among eminent men.”299  
Though not denying him political ability, particularly as related to ruthless pragmatism, 
military prowess, and impetuosity of spirit, Machiavelli ultimately censures with clear 
vitriol the memory of Agathocles. Seemingly, if Machiavelli’s goal of politics and moral 
system were related to political expediency, the acquiring of power, and totally divorced 
from Christian morality, Agathocles should be among the those singled out for 
admiration in his concluding ‘Exhortation.’  
However, it is precisely because Machiavelli’s purpose of politics was one that 
intermixed the pursuit of glory with the involvement of God as understood by Christian 
theology that Agathocles is condemned as a villain and tyrant in The Prince, while Moses 
stands at the forefront of Machiavelli’s greatest men and is exalted among all others. 
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Agathocles, a direct example of how a vice can be used as a virtue for political 
expediency—thus typifying what Skinner and Gilbert’s understood to be Machiavelli’s 
redefinition of virtù—was denied glory while Moses showed the pathway to the ultimate 
achievement of political goals through friendship with God.  
Implicit in this discussion of cruelty used well is Moses himself. Recorded in The 
Prince as an ‘armed prophet’ and praised for supplementing persuasion with force, 
Machiavelli gives further explanation of Moses’s actions in the Discourses. There he 
writes in reference to Exodus 32: “since he wished his laws and his orders to go forward, 
Moses was forced to kill infinite men who, moved by nothing other than envy, were 
opposed to his plans.”300 Undoubtedly, Machiavelli considered Moses’ purge to be an act 
of cruelty. Further, Moses even claims divine authority for his orders to kill those who 
had turned away from God and His laws. The granting of such divine authority, however, 
is not recorded in Exodus. Such a thing Machiavelli surely would have considered as 
operating under the cloak of religion for one’s own purposes.301  
However, as Viroli explains, Machiavelli understood Moses’ behavior to be: “a 
perfect example of a cruelty used well.”302 And, as has been seen, Machiavelli asserted 
that those who use cruelty well can: “with God and with men, somewhat enhance their 
position.”303 For Moses, his cruelty was performed in order to remove the threat of 
idolatry and disbelief from consuming the nation of God. Moses’ cruelty was used well 
because it was not used for himself, but rather to protect and enforce the law of God, 
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which he understood as the only true path to goodness. In this way, Machiavelli saw from 
Exodus that Moses was in fact able to use the evil of cruelty well, and in doing so saved 
his state from corruption, which ultimately enhanced his position with God.  
After the events of the golden calf, the following chapter of Exodus records the 
moment of supreme interaction between God and Moses, saying: “the LORD spake unto 
Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend.”304 Not only was Moses not 
punished by God, he was instead granted a personal conversation with Him. For 
Machiavelli, the lesson of Exodus was clear: God did not punish those who were forced 
by necessity to commit evil—so long as their purpose and method remained one that 
could bring out glory, which itself comes from God. Machiavelli understood the nature of 
friendship between God and Moses as recorded in the Bible to alleviate both the deficient 
sin nature of man and the powers of malignant fortune, and this was the nature of 
friendship he triumphantly included in The Prince.  
Conclusion 
 
The hero of The Prince for Machiavelli was undoubtedly Moses.305 Placing him 
foremost on his list of eminent men, Moses held the position of greatest honor in the 
mind of Machiavelli. As he wrote later in his Discourses:  
“Among all men praised, the most praised are those who have been heads and 
orderers of religions. Next, then, are those who have founded either republics or 
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kingdoms. After them are celebrated those who, placed over armies, have 
expanded their kingdom or that of the fatherland.”306 
As prophet of God and redeemer of his people, Moses symbolized the zenith of 
Machiavelli’s hierarchy of greatness. Further, Moses brought down the Ten 
Commandments and the law of God to his people, and established a new political order. 
In the ‘Exhortation’, Machiavelli declares: “nothing brings a man greater honour than the 
new laws and new institutions he establishes. When these are soundly based and bear the 
mark of greatness, they make him revered and admired.”307 And when his state was 
threatened, when the law given to him by God was rejected, Moses acted as he had to in 
order preserve good order and faith: “since he wished his laws and his orders to go 
forward, Moses was forced to kill infinite men who, moved by nothing other than envy, 
were opposed to his plans.”308  
 There is an almost tangible presence of personal attachment when Machiavelli 
considers Moses. Tellingly, Machiavelli’s assertion that those who opposed Moses were 
‘moved by nothing other than envy,’ is an active revision of the passage as it occurs in 
Exodus. In the Bible, though he is the servant of God and divine mouthpiece to the 
Israelites, it is not Moses that the people turn against, but rather God Himself. Exodus 32 
reads: “And the LORD said unto Moses, Go, get thee down; for thy people, which thou 
broughtest out of the land of Egypt, have corrupted themselves: They have turned aside 
quickly out of the way which I commanded them”.309 However, in his conception 
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presented in the Discourses, Machiavelli remains focused on the person of Moses. Most 
likely his addition of ‘envy’ was gathered from an earlier verse in the same chapter:  
“And when the people saw that Moses delayed to come down out of the mount, 
the people gathered themselves together unto Aaron, and said unto him, Up, make 
us gods, which shall go before us; for as for this Moses, the man that brought us 
up out of the land of Egypt, we wot not what is become of him.”310 
Certainly, Machiavelli’s addition of ‘envy’ reorients the biblical story to better 
suit his on-going argument in that section of the Discourses. But even so, Machiavelli’s 
version injects a personal element into the discourse, centered upon defending the actions 
of Moses. This is made even more clear when considering the introductory preface 
Machiavelli gives to his iteration of the passage from Exodus. Here he opines: “He who 
reads the Bible intelligently sees that if Moses…”311 As is so often the case, an 
‘intelligent’ reading of the Bible for Machiavelli translated to reading it as he himself 
would, and did. Such a statement is inherently subjective, and thus his following 
consideration of Moses is given through his own personal biases.  
 The personal element to Machiavelli’s discussion of Moses is seen again 
throughout The Prince. Moses is praised in Chapter VI as an ‘armed prophet’ in reference 
to the passage in Exodus 32. In the scriptures, however, it is not Moses that personally 
takes up arms in the defense of his laws and orders, but rather the Levites who do so at 
his command: “Then Moses stood in the gate of the camp…And the children of Levi did 
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according to the word of Moses: and there fell of the people that day about three thousand 
men.”312 But again, we find a variation in Machiavelli’s discussion, whereby his praise of 
an ‘armed prophet’ implies much more active involvement taken on the part of Moses in 
fighting against his enemies.  
It should, of course, certainly be conceded that such a revisionist implication 
could be logically caused simply though the rhetorical method utilized here by 
Machiavelli, perhaps for expediency of message. When Moses’ status as an ‘unarmed 
prophet’ is compared with that David, another biblical figure considered within The 
Prince, however, the argument regarding Machiavelli’s personal preference toward 
Moses becomes far stronger. In Chapter XIII: Auxiliary, composite, and native troops, 
Machiavelli acknowledges David as the perfect example for demonstrating the need to 
take up your own arms. Recalling the story of David and Goliath from the Old 
Testament, he writes: “Saul, to inspire [David] with courage, gave him his own weapons 
and armour. Having tried these on, David rejected them, saying that he would be unable 
to fight well with them and therefore wanted to face the enemy with his sling and his 
knife.”313 Machiavelli then concludes with one of the precepts most fundamental to his 
political philosophy: “In short, armour belonging to someone else either drops off you or 
weighs you down or is too tight.”314 At its full conclusion, Machiavelli iterates this lesson 
exemplified by David as a central reason why a prince should not rely upon mercenary 
troops, but rather his own people and arms.  
                                                
312 Exodus 32:26, 28. 
313 The Prince, 13 (Bull, The Prince, 46). 
314 Ibid., 13 (Bull, The Prince, 46). 
 102 
It should also be noted, that, as we have seen, David was chosen by God to be the 
redeeming king of Israel after the corrupted rule of Saul. The prophet Samuel anointed 
David as king after fulfilling God’s call to find ‘a man after His own heart.’315 Further, it 
was from the very line and lineage of David that God brought His son, Jesus, into the 
world as Christ. As Paul writes in the New Testament: “and [God] said, I have found 
David the son of Jesse, a man after mine own heart, which shall fulfill all my will. Of this 
man’s seed hath God according to his promise raised unto Israel a Savior, Jesus.”316 It 
was through David, therefore, that the nation of Israel was truly redeemed, and that the 
religion of Christianity was later realized—each things listed among Machiavelli’s 
hierarchy of greatness.  
However, it remains Moses and not David that leads the great men Machiavelli 
emphasizes for imitation. The reason for this is found in a further instance of interpretive 
biblical revision in The Prince. When first introducing Moses in Chapter VI as an 
example to be praised, Machiavelli qualifies: “Although one should not reason about 
Moses, since he merely executed what God commanded, yet he must be praised for the 
grace which made him worthy of speaking with God.”317 Interestingly, Machiavelli here 
directs the bounty of grace not toward God, but instead toward Moses. It is Moses who 
possessed grace, which made him worthy of speaking with God; although, as we have 
seen, Machiavelli very clearly understood that it was God whom, through the grace 
characteristic of His divine nature, selected and provided opportunity for men to count 
Him as a friend. Rather than be seen as a heterodox or irreligious claim, this puzzling 
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accreditation of grace is in fact yet another instance of Machiavelli gently altering 
scripture to promote a more favorable interpretation of his hero.  
Further, it is Machiavelli’s definition of Moses’ grace that exposes the true nature 
of his favoritism. The grace that Machiavelli attributed Moses was concerned with 
Moses’ love for his own people. As we have seen, even before God had first appeared to 
him in the burning bush, Moses had acted to save a Hebrew from being beaten by an 
Egyptian.318 Despite being raised within the house of the Egyptian pharaoh himself,319 
Exodus records that Moses had still considered the Hebrew man to be of his own people: 
“and [Moses] spied an Egyptian smiting an Hebrew, one of his brethren.”320 With no 
regard to his own position or self-interest, Moses acted to save his one of brethren from 
tyranny: “he slew the Egyptian, and hid him in the sand.”321 No doubt Machiavelli saw in 
this a kindred spirit—one, like himself who loved his patria more than his own soul.  
Finally, Moses is Machiavelli’s true hero of The Prince for the reason that he 
never entered the promised land. Despite leading his people in redemption from slavery 
in Egypt, and ordering and maintaining the law of God, Moses was ultimately denied a 
part in the state he labored so long to create. After disregarding God’s command and 
striking the rock twice, God punished Moses for his public disobedience: “And the 
LORD spake unto Moses and Aaron, Because ye believed me not, to sanctify me in the 
eyes of the children of Israel, therefore ye shall not bring this congregation into the land 
which I have given them.”322  
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As we have seen, throughout The Prince and especially in the final ‘Exhortation’, 
Machiavelli calls for the new prince to imitate the actions and lives of Moses. Though he 
dedicated his treatise to Lorenzo dé Medici and advised him on how to rule as a monarch, 
Machiavelli remained at heart a republican still. However, as he wrote in the Discourses: 
“this should be taken as a general rule: that it never or rarely happens that any republic or 
kingdom is ordered well from the beginning or reformed altogether anew outside its old 
orders unless it is ordered by one individual.”323 Machiavelli understood that Italy, and 
more specifically Florence, in its present state was not able to sustain a republic. What it 
needed was a singular agent to reorder the laws and institutions, and then to step aside to 
allow for the creation of a new, stronger Florentine Republic. It needed a Moses.  
He wrote explicitly of this progression in the Discourse on Florentine Affairs he 
presented to Giulio dé Medici several years after he wrote The Prince. As Black 
summarizes: “In this Discourse, Machiavelli had proposed that Florence should, in the 
first instance, be transformed into a monarchy and then, following the deaths of Leo X 
and Cardinal Giulio, become a republic.”324 And Machiavelli asserts that this task should 
be undertaken “from the House of Medici” and in doing so earn “your own glory” 
through establishing “a stable government in Florence.”325 Thus, in the same language as 
his ‘Exhortation’, Machiavelli asserts that a new Medici ruler should redeem his country 
and win glory for himself through reordering its laws and institutions, and then step aside. 
And if Machiavelli sought such a goal when he wrote The Prince, which it is safe to 
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contend he did, then it follows that he could think of no greater example for imitation 
than that of Moses.
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